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The aim of the presented research is to improve our understanding of the human cognitive
system, its functions and how it produces various sequences of behaviour. Wherever possible
the neurophysiological underpinnings of the cognitive functions will be taken into account.
A central hypothesis is that internal, cognitive functions can be characterised by hierarchical
kinds of processing or representations. Some of the issues and open research questions will
become more graspable when considering how long people have been looking for answers
and how according concepts developed and changed over time. Therefore, I will very briefly
look into how humans approached the questions of cognition, its structure and control of
behaviour and, moreover, how these questions were tied to the neural system.
Mankind has been interested ever since in the functions of the human cognitive apparatus
(historically also called ”psychological faculties”). Alkmaion of Kroton related cognitive
functions1 for the first time empirically to the brain in ancient Greece during the sixth cen-
tury BCwhich was later accepted by Hioppocrates of Kos. (Aristotle, in contrast, claimed the
heart to house perceptual and cognitive functions in his work On the soul (1947) and thereby
encouraged a fundamentally different approach.) Nerve fibres as distinct tissue connecting
the body’s periphery with the brain were discovered independently by Herophilos and Era-
sistratus (both Greek physicians) during the third century BC (cf: Oeser, 2002; Oeser, &
Seitelberger, 1989). Importantly, this finding provides an empirical basis for an explanation
of the brain’s control of behaviour and body sensations. Later, the famous Greek physi-
cian Galen of Pergamon promoted the brain’s role in sensation, cognition and behaviour and
influenced the scientific perspective for centuries even though Aristole’s concept was also
widely used.
From ancient times through the middle ages, three cognitive domains (”faculties”) were
mostly distinguished but their functional relationship was hardly addressed. Above the level
of modality-specific, sensory processing the three domains sensus communis (amodal per-
ception), vis cogitativa sometimes incl. phantasia (reason and/or imagination of percepts in
1The terms used here are nowadays approximate equivalents for better understanding. There may be interesting, con-
ceptual differences among the various terms but this project does not focus on precise historical conceptions.
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the absence of sensory stimulation) and vis memorativa (memory) were distinguished and
believed to serve human thinking (cf: Oeser, & Seitelberger, 1989; Clarke, & Dewhurst,
1973). These domains were assigned incorrectly to three cells (i.e., compartments) located
within the brain (corresponding to the four ventricles) for a long time.2
Needless to say, the cognitive influence (presumably to be understood as voluntary in-
fluence) on behaviour was also recognised in those early times, but it was hardly integrated
into the concepts of the cognitive apparatus. A theoretical motor component, membro motiva
(alluding to the body impulsion and associated with the fourth ventricle), appeared in some
works during the 15th century but this concept might be traced back to Galen’s work (Clarke,
& Dewhurst, 1973, p. 29 & 33).
To be clear, there was a strong emphasis on the brain’s and the body’s structure rather than
on the functions which were more deeply considered since about the 17th century (Putscher,
1972, pp. 88). However, even those early concepts distinguished at least two cognitive levels
of processing and recognised (very few) distinct cognitive domains. Importantly, if there is
any functional relationship expressed, it was a linear propagation of information3 into the
cognitive apparatus (from the senses through an integrated perception, sensus communis,
towards the last domain of the ”input path,” namely memory; Oeser, & Seitelberger, 1989,
pp. 10) and out again (which was hardly specified).
Without reviewing the history of cognitive (neuro)science, an important discovery for the
present work (habilitation) is the electrical excitability of the cerebral cortex by Fritsch and
Hitzig in the 19th century (e.g., Gross, 2007). This discovery is, of course, the basis for
the non-invasive, in vivo recording of the electrical brain activity, the electroencephalogram
(EEG) which was first applied to humans by Berger in 1929. One advantage of the EEG
methodology is that it is very well suited to investigate temporal aspects of the neurocognitive
system but spatial aspects are more difficult to assess by means of EEG.
Spatial differences in the neural processing and representation of cognitive functions,
i.e., the concept of a functional localisation has been disputed over centuries before Bell and
Magendie showed empirically for the first time a functional dissociation between the ventral
and the dorsal nerve fibres of the spinal cord in the early 19th century which is now known
as the Bell-Magendie law. Higher functions have subsequently been localised; Fritsch and
Hitzig found the motor area in animals (rabbits & dogs), Munk localised visual processing in
the occipital lobe (cf: Oeser, 2002; Shiraev, 2015) and, as it is well-known, Broca and Wer-
2Sometimes the cognitive domains estimativa, imaginativa or rationalis are added within the same cells (Clarke, &
Dewhurst, 1973, pp. 18).
3Actually, pneuma psychikon (spiritus animalis) was assumed to be transported which means that pneuma was assumed
to have material features, however, ”pneuma” was not well-defined. In any case, pneuma had conceptually material and
spiritual features.
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nicke localised expressive and receptive language functions in the posterior frontal and the
posterior temporal cortex, respectively (Broca, 1861; Wernicke, 1874; Dronkers, Plaisant,
Iba-Zizen, & Cabanis, 2007). Nowadays, localisation aspects do not depend on evidence
from lesion studies or patient studies alone but neuroimaging methods such as functional
resonance imaging (fMRI) are available since the early 1990s to investigate spatial aspects
of neurocognitive functions non-invasively also in healthy humans.
In this project, I try to make a contribution to our understanding of the human neurocog-
nitive system. That is, it is examined whether processing in (some) cognitive domains inter-
acts with one another and how the according functions can be related to neurophysiological
brain processes (for a tight relation between brain and mind see already Lurija’s work) (e.g.,
1970). Specifically, event-related potentials (ERPs; calculated from the EEG) will be used
for assessment of the brain’s electrical activity and fMRI will be employed to determine the
functional neuroanatomical localisation of given effects. Furthermore, behavioural and cog-
nitive measurements will provide evidence to understand the functional significance of the
observed effects.
Based on the thesis that the human cognitive system is action-centred, i.e., optimised for
adequate behaviour in an evolutionary sense, and the insight that serial processing alone is
not sufficient to explain human behaviour (e.g., in stimulus-response or response-response
associations), various cognitive domains will be investigated regarding the hierarchical pro-
cessing of information or hierarchical representations thereof. In particular, the domains
of language (production & comprehension), action control, and to some extent visual (se-
quence) perception will be addressed.
The perspective taken here, puts an emphasis on the cognitive influence on behaviour
(i.e., voluntary movements; cf: Prinz, 1990; Jeannerod, 2006), less on sensorimotor con-
trol processes, especially in the work on action control. This perspective can be related to
cognitive models of perception and/or action such as, for example, common coding (Prinz,
1987, 1990, 1997), theory of event coding (Hommel, Mu¨sseler, Aschersleben, & Prinz,
2001), anticipative behavioral control (Hoffmann, 1993; Hoffmann, Butz, Herbort, Kiesel,
& Lenhard, 2007) and cognitive architecture of action approach (CAAA, Schack, 2010;
Schack, & Ritter, 2009, 2013) which assume an internal, hierarchical architecture of the
cognitive system, rather than a (mechanistic) linear processing chain. Many of these theo-
ries can be traced back to the ideomotor approach that dates back to Lotze (1966/1852) and
James (1890; cf: Shin, Proctor, & Capaldi, 2010) and incorporates the idea of bi-directional
connections between sensations and actions. That is, imagined (or anticipated) action ef-
fects (i.e., sensory action consequences) can facilitate the execution of the imagined action
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(Herbart, 1968/1850, xx129 & 155). Also, more central, cognitive domains such as lan-
guage (e.g., Levelt, 1989; Caramazza, Laudanna, & Romani, 1988; Pinker, 1991; Roelofs,
1998; Friederici, 1995; Hagoort, Brown, & Osterhout, 1999; Marslen-Wilson, & Welsh,
1978, from the vast amount of language research) can tie together perceptual and action pro-
cesses as in almost all conversations there will be an exchange of comprehension (listening
or reading) and speaking (or writing). Moreover, during language translation comprehen-
sion and speaking occur almost simultaneously. So, the perspective taken here construes the
cognitive system as a hierarchically organised architecture of domains (or modules; Nor-
man, 1980; Velichkovsky, 1993). The domains are supposedly interactive (or they shared
processing resources) and processing is effect-related, that is, behaviour should be organised
in a manner to optimally fulfil the task demands (e.g., Mechsner, Kerzel, Knoblich, & Prinz,
2001; Prinz, 1990; Marken, 1986).
In what follows, I will briefly discuss aspects of the (neuro)cognitive system that are
relevant for the presently proposed perspective. Specifically, I will talk about the role of
hierarchical processing and representations and whether the cognitive system should be con-
ceived of as consisting of distinct modules (Ch. 1). Wherever it is adequate, I will make
reference to publications that are relevant for the habilitation project throughout this synop-
sis. I will then discuss some relevant aspects of action control. A classification of responses
will be presented and some experimental work that is related to the architecture of move-
ment control. Furthermore, recent advances in neurophysiological methodology for action
research and movement science will be presented (Ch. 2). Next, I will discuss recent exper-
imental contributions to the domain of language processing (production & comprehension)
in Ch. 3 with a focus on lexical processing and more specifically on compound words. In
Chapter 4 (Domain interactions), I will provide evidence for an influence of prediction on
early neurophysiological processes of language comprehension and, more generally, report
on interaction effects among the cognitive domains of motor control (grasping), language,
and working memory. Here; I will also touch briefly the visual domain. Shared neural re-
sources for non-verbal sequence processing and verbal sequence processing (grammar) will
be discussed before, finally, summarising the findings. Part II provides a list of publications
for the habilitation and Part III contains the original prints of these publications (Kumulus).
Chapter 1
The (neuro)cognitive system
The aim of this project is to advance a perspective on the cognitive system that considers the
exchange of information among domains, that is, whether and how specific domains interact
or share processing resources. To this end some empirical evidence will be provided for the
domains of language processing, action control and visual perception. At times, the rele-
vant cognitive functions will be tied to neurophysiological underpinnings and also related
in a functional sense to behavioural data. More specifically, after discussing some relevant
aspects of the cognitive system regarding the control of behaviour, this project investigated
cognitive processes in the fields of speaking, language comprehension, visual sequence pro-
cessing and action control and possible relations among some of these fields (e.g., MacKay,
1987). In these fields, hierarchical processing or representations play a functional role which
may, arguably, not be completely identical across these fields (or all cognitive domains).
Within this project, hierarchical processing or representations will be considered as a po-
tential common feature of the various domains of the human cognitive system, especially
regarding action effects.
At the beginning of empirical scientific approaches to psychology, introspection provided
a prominent theoretical framework since the late 19th century. When introspection has been
criticised for its limited objectivity, behaviourism emerged as a contrasting framework dur-
ing the early 20th century. Here, the serial nature of behaviour was emphasised as expressed
in the concept of stimulus-response (S-R) associations1 and for more complex behaviour in
response-response associations or chains. That is, for complex behaviour, some motor activ-
ity was assumed to act as a stimulus through its sensory consequences (e.g. proprioceptive)
for the subsequent motor activity. The serial nature of this S-R model goes back to the propo-
sition of Pavlov and Bekhterev that psychological process are reflex mechanisms of the brain
1For operant conditioning, these associations include reinforcement: Stimulus-Response-Reinforcement, but this differ-
ence does not change the present argument.
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in analogy to the physiological reflex associations. The S-R model is a mechanistic approach
which, therefore, permits clear predictions. Hence, it can be considered to be very objective
(cf: Shiraev, 2015).
The S-R model has not only been applied to motor behaviour but also to language pro-
cessing (Skinner, 1957). Skinner who was interested in the whole organism not only in
separable responses believed that all behaviour is conditioned, i.e., acquired through expe-
rience. Consequently, also language is assumed to be determined by reinforcing conditions.
In other words, language would be learned as any other behaviour. Conversation partners
are seen as providing reinforcement and speaking would, accordingly, be a complex chain of
responses emphasising the serial nature of language (comprehension & production). The lin-
earity of the S-R model has been criticised for both domains, action and language (Lashley,
1951). Bernstein pointed out that goals of an action are necessary to explain motor control
(for an extension, see also Velichkovsky, 1993). Actually, they are more important for motor
control than the current body state of the actor2, see also Rosenbaum, Jorgensen and col-
leagues (Rosenbaum, Marchak, Bames, Vaughan, Siotta, & Jorgensen, 1990; Rosenbaum,
& Jorgensen, 1992). Goals represent, obviously, higher levels of representation than mo-
tor commands and, therefore, imply a hierarchical conception of action control (Bernstein,
1967, Ch. 2, originally published in 1935). Also, Lashley (1951) argued that an explanation
of complex actions (incl. language) requires a ”generalized schema . . .which determines the
sequence of specific acts” because the specific acts do not contain sequential information
(p. 122; see also MacNeilage, & MacNeilage, 1973). Similarly, Chomsky (1959) famously
pointed out that language processing needs hierarchical representations because correspond-
ing words can be separated by a number of other words which cannot be explained with as-
sociations between adjacent words (i.e., long-distance dependencies). Moreover, people can
create truly novel (correct) sentences which should not be possible if grammatical phrases
depend on reinforcement learning, i.e., repeated encounters. These early arguments and in-
vestigations suggested that a serial conception of the human cognitive system is too limited
and needs some modifications such as a vertical dimensions (i.e., a hierarchical organisation;
Velichkovsky, 1993).
Historically, other frameworks of that time, such as psychoanalysis orGestalt psychology,
contrasted with behaviourism. Another strong alternative, namely the information process-
ing account, emerged in the mid-20th century and is largely accepted in current cognitive
psychology. Cognitive models often incorporate hierarchically organised processing levels.
At the same time, they shifted the focus of inquiry towards central, cognitive processes (i.e.,
2For example, Bernstein investigated trajectories of hammering movements in experts and novices and found that experts
hit a chisel with higher precision although the movement trajectories varied on every strike (Feigenberg, 2014, p. 42).
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reasoning Miller, 2003; Walach, 2013), such as thinking, problem-solving, or (conceptual)
memory, with little connection to action control. At least in relation to the research effort
on the ”input” side, one can say, the ”output” side, i.e., action control has been neglected
to some extent (Jeannerod, 1985; Rosenbaum, 2005). Even though scientific investigations
used to a substantial part very simple actions (e.g., button-press responses which can be ac-
complished by contracting one muscle) as an experimental model of behaviour, at least the
notion of an internal, mental model for the control of (complex) behaviour has been intro-
duced from a process-oriented (Miller, Galanter, & Pribram, 1960) and a content-oriented
perspective (Bandura, 1965; Kanfer, & Phillips, 1970, Chaps. 5 & 8). The notion of internal
models is still widely accepted.
However, only recently research has begun to examine complex human action control
more widely, for example, the above-mentioned studies in the tradition of the ideomotor ap-
proach (e.g., Prinz, 1987; Jeannerod, 1985, 2006; Rosenbaum, Marchak, Bames, Vaughan,
Siotta, & Jorgensen, 1990; Schack, 1999, 2010, Prinz, Beisert, & Herwig, 2013). Clearly,
more research is required that examines the control of complex actions for a broad under-
standing of human behaviour.
1.1 An action-centred approach
Within this project, I would like to argue that theories of the cognitive system should not
neglect action control. From an evolutionary point of view, cognitive functions, no matter
how complex or ”high” they are in terms of abstract capabilities, seem to have evolved in
the service of optimal control of behaviour (e.g., Hoffmann, 1993; Nitsch, 2000; Llina´s,
2001). In this sense, human life is action-centred (and meaning-driven3) and, therefore, a
theory of the human cognitive system should not only incorporate but also focus on action
control. In fact, if behaviour is not narrowly defined as muscle activity but to include all
related structures and sub processes, especially control processes for complex actions, then
behaviour more widely defined can be seen to contain a vast range of responses (Koester, &
Schack, 2014)4. As shown in Figure1.1, human responses can broadly be classified in overt
vs. covert responses (incl. mental processes) and further into central vs. peripheral responses.
Accordingly, any organ of the human body can be involved in one type of response or another
which is good reason to consider action control in theories of the human cognitive system.
3I would like to mention in passing that optimal human behaviour can probably not be reduced to mechanistic pro-
cesses as our cognitive system is more governed by semantic associations than by rational or logic relations (Fischler,
Bloom, Childers, Roucos, & Perry, 1983; Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 1982; Kahneman, 2011) or cognitive heuristics
(Gigerenzer, & Brighton, 2009, for review)
4References to publications for the habilitation will be typeset in boldface.
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Responses
behavioural emotional cognitivephysiological
Figure 1.1: Subdivision of responses into multiple response systems
1.2 Hierarchical processing and representations
As mentioned, the motor system is characterised by hierarchical processing. The historical
conception of a strict separation of sensory and motor systems as input and output pathways
was challenged by the important introduction of an additional process, namely a comparison
operation (Miller et al., 1960). Pribram (1971) proposed that the so-called TOTE mechanism
(test-operate-test-exit as a cyclic process) is a fundamental property of the nervous system
as it was now considered an information processing device. The TOTE mechanism refers
to a constant comparison between an actual and a ”desired” state (test). If a deviance is
detected, a change is prompted (operate); if there is no deviation, no changes are necessary
(exit). As an example showing that sensory and motor signal cannot be strictly separated,
Pribram (1971, Chaps. 5, 12 & 13) proposed TOTE to function as a servo mechanism for
movement control (i.e., muscle activity) which he sees in the reflex arc within the spinal cord.
That is, sensory signals (e.g., muscle length measured through neuromuscular spindles) and
motor signal (a and g motor neurons) are interdependent and can be modulated from higher
neural centres. (That is, higher centres do not encode muscle contractions but represent
modulatory commands for the spinal control mechanism.5) This hierarchical organisation
of the neurophysiological motor system is still maintained in current reasoning (e.g., Pritzel,
Brand, & Markowitsch, 2003; Grafton, Aziz-Zadeh, & Ivry, 2009; Trepel, 2012).
It has not only been argued for a hierarchical organisation of movement control on this
”lower” neurophysiological level (spinal cord) but also on ”higher” levels when it comes to
more complex actions involving more muscles or effectors and their co-ordination. Cogni-
tive phenomena such as goals, predictions or intentions are correlated with cortical activ-
ity and have also been seen to be effective very early on in human development (Gergely,
Bekkering, & Kira´ly, 2002, see also Schachner, & Carey, 2013). Gergely and colleagues
demonstrated that preverbal infants imitate novel actions (pressing a buzzer with one’s fore-
head) but only if the hands of the model are constrained and, thus, are not available for the
5Interestingly, Pribram (1971, pp. 250) also assumes that higher level control encodes ”environmental contingencies”
of the movement execution, i.e., anticipated movement effects.
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action. This suggests that infants’ actions are influenced by the model’s intention. Such an
early, developmental influence of intentions on action control underlines the fundamental
role of cognitive representations for human behaviour (and observation learning). Notewor-
thy, there is not only a hierarchical organisation across various levels of movement control,
from reflex mechanisms (spinal cord), to body postures (among others, cerebral cortex) up
to action goals (cognitive representations), but there are also hierarchical relations within the
cognitive level. With reference to the ideomotor principle, Wohlschla¨ger et al. argue that goal
representations are hierarchically structured, not the according motor programmes or (sub)
movements (Wohlschla¨ger, Gattis, & Bekkering, 2003; Whiten, Flynn, Lee, & Lee, 2006).
That is, people may execute different movements than observed (during imitation) in order
to achieve an inferred goal of a model. Again, these findings point towards an important,
maybe fundamental mechanism human action control in that behaviour (and reasoning) is
organised in a hierarchical fashion, although it is oftentimes realised in a sequential manner.
Similarly, in language processing, hierarchical structures play an important role too.
Here, the empirical research field has evolved sub divisions. With some exceptions (e.g.,
the logogen model beginning with Morton, 1969; Patterson, & Shewell, 1987; Coltheart,
Rastle, Perry, Langdon, & Ziegler, 2001, computational model rooted in the parallel dis-
tributed processing approach; Rumelhart & McClelland, 1986 and McClelland & Rumel-
hart, 1986) usually aim to connect language input and output 6 ), language comprehension
is largely investigated separately from language production, roughly corresponding to ”in-
put” and ”output” streams. On an independent dimension, oftentimes a phrasal (syntactic), a
lexical, a phonological and an articulatory level are distinguished and serve as research foci.
In this project, I will mainly focus on the lexical level, that is, on the structure of words
and how structural changes of words are processed (morphology). For example, ”know.ing”7
(inflection), ”un.believ.able” (derivation) and ”movement science” (compounding; in English
morpheme boundaries are often indicated by a space) are all internally structured words
which are thought to reflect three different word formation mechanisms according to stan-
dard linguistic theory. In addition to Chomky’s arguments mention above against a serial
association mechanism for sentence processing, it should be noted that language is inher-
ently hierarchically composed. A finite set of phonemes is used to construct an in principle
extendible set of words; a finite set of words is used to form an (in principle) infinite set of
sentences and discourse may be seen as another level. That is, linguistic processing units
vary in their scope and, importantly, lead to qualitative changes, namely they reflect sounds
6Interestingly, connectionist models have a high biological plausibility. However, the questions of neural implementa-
tion and processing mechanisms are independent. Here, I will not discuss aspects of implementation of cognitive models
(cf: Yuste, 2015a; Rubinov, 2015; Yuste, 2015b).
7Dots indicate morpheme boundaries.
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but on ”higher” levels meaning and possibly intentions which may provide a processing
connection to action control.
A different stance is taken by computational network approaches. Such approaches usu-
ally deny an explicit representation of word structure (morphology). Uninflected words (e.g.,
”walk”), for example, are mapped through massively parallel distributed processing units in
task-devoted computational networks onto past tense forms (”walked” in our example Pinker,
& Ullman, 2002; McClelland, & Patterson, 2002). Interestingly, such networks can also cor-
rectly map irregular forms such as ”go” onto ”went.” In this view, morphology itself is
not considered necessary for word formation; all apparent morphological effects are thought
to result from the (combined) processing of semantic and phonological information, i.e.,
without an intermediate, connecting level of processing. Oftentime, morphological effects
are claimed to result from subtle semantic or phonological differences among stimulus lists
(e.g., Joanisse, & Seidenberg, 1999; Plaut, & Gonnerman, 2000).
However, if morphological effects are observed in cases where neither semantics nor
phonology differ, one has to consider morphological processing as an effective cognitive
mechanism. In fact, morphological priming effects have been shown for compound pro-
duction (speaking) where the effects resulted from the comparison of the very same words
which had been primed differently (Koester, & Schiller, 2008, 2011). The use of a so-called
long-lag priming paradigm makes it possible to fully control the influence of semantics and
phonology (cf: Zwitserlood, Bo¨lte, & Dohmes, 2000; Feldman, 2000; Dohmes, Zwitserlood,
& Bo¨lte, 2004, for compounds). Hence, it is argued that we cannot dispense of morphologi-
cal processing levels, i.e., hierarchical structure in our models of language production.
For understanding compounds, their morphological structure is also relevant (Downing,
1977; Fabb, 2001). That is, for most compounds, their constituents have to be identified,
and their morphological status has to be taken into account in order to correctly interpret
the whole compound (e.g., Taft, & Forster, 1976; Marslen-Wilson, 2001). In Dutch, as
in English and German, the last constituent in compounds determines the semantic category,
again underlining the hierarchical nature of word representations. (This relation varies across
languages.) For example, ”movement science” refers to particular field of science, not to a
particular sort of movement. One major debate in the area of compound comprehension
focuses on whether and how the constituents are separated. That is, how the compound is
decomposed (e.g., Sandra, 1990; Zwitserlood, 1994; Baayen, Dijkstra, & Schreuder, 1997;
Isel, Gunter, & Friederici, 2003; Koester, Gunter, Wagner, & Friederici, 2004; Janssen, Bi,
& Caramazza, 2008). In this context, we pointed out that after decomposition another step is
necessary for a successful understanding of the compounds, namely semantic composition,
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the integration of the constituent meanings taken their morphological status into account
(Koester, Holle, &Gunter, 2009; Holle, Gunter, &Koester, 2010). This poses the question
whether compounds are processed differently than non-compound words and if this is the
case, how the processing is controlled. Prosody is a promising candidate as it differs for
compound and non-compounds words (Vogel, & Raimy, 2002; Koester et al., 2004) and
has been shown to change the brain processing that is presumably underlying the evaluation
performance regarding compounds (Koester, 2014).
In any case, it is highly implausible that the language system is organised in a non-
hierarchical manner. Whereas computational, connectionist model make the claim that struc-
ture lexical processing (morphology) can be dispensed of, it is inconceivable how such a
system would deal with sentence processing. Especially Chomsky’s (1959) argument that
humans can create and understand sentences that they have never perceived before, seems
not to be reconcilable with fundamentally associative processing mechanisms. Even simpler
theories of syntax include a considerable amount of rules, i.e., non-associative mechanisms
(e.g., Culicover, & Jackendoff, 2005).
Turning to the visual domain, i.e., reading, structural (word) information can also be
found employed by readers. Generally, it is obvious from eye movements during reading that
text is not read, i.e., scanned linearly (Clifton Jr., Ferreira, Henderson, Inhoff, Liversedge,
Reichle, & Schotter, 2016; Tanenhaus, Spivey-Knowlton, Eberhard, & Sedivy, 1995). Nei-
ther letters nor words are serially fixated and there is a considerable amount of re-fixations as
well as frequent skipping of words, especially functions words. Specifically, for compound
words we could show in Dutch, where compounds are written without spaces (e.g., ”beweg-
ingswetenschappen,” ”beweging” [movement] + ”wetenschap” [science]), that letter combi-
nations that can only occur at morpheme boundaries are used as signals for decomposing
the compound word which helps in determining the meaning of the whole word (Lemho¨fer,
Koester, & Schreuder, 2011); the role of similar segmentation cues has previously been
discussed (e.g., Inhoff, Radach, & Heller, 2000; Bertram, Pollatsek, & Hyo¨na¨, 2004).
Taken together, it appears obvious that complex actions and language are governed to
some extent by hierarchical processing and representations. However, it still remains to be
clarified what are the precise functional neuroanatomical and temporal characteristics of the
underlying biological processes. At least three aspects seem to be characteristic of hierar-
chical representations. First, categorisation is a necessary but not a sufficient condition. If
only instances of objects or events could be recognised, it would seem impossible to treat
equivalent objects or events in the same way. Second, recursion can be expected to be pos-
sible in hierarchical representations. That is, categories of objects or events can be repeated
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or embedded, even in themselves. This feature permits the creation of, in principle, an in-
finite number of sequences and the creation of novels sequences. The TOTE mechanism
can be seen as a simple mechanism featuring recursion. Third, long-distance dependen-
cies are a typical aspect of hierarchical representations. That is, specific objects or events
are not determined by the preceding element but by elements at a further distance such as
subject-verb agreements in longer sentences where the subject and the verb are separated by
intervening words or a phrase. The same holds true for complex actions where preparatory
sub movements (e.g., the run-up in long jump, impacts later, non-adjacent sub movements
(e.g., the landing). These aspects do not have to be found in conjunction and not in every rep-
resentation that is hierarchical; hierarchical representations seem to require categorisation.
Recursion and long-distance dependencies appear to be indicators of hierarchical processing
or representations, that is they are not both necessary.
1.3 Modularity
As said, action control can be seen as a bridge to connect various cognitive domains which
have been investigated separately because the concerted cognitive activities should optimise
the behaviour (Norman, 1980; Hoffmann, 1993). Under ordinary circumstances, our sub-
jective experience of the world is coherent and united. We do not, for example, experience
objects as consisting of separate features such as colour, shape texture or size; we experience
one object.8 Contrary, to such a unitary subjective experience, psychological science largely
approached its subject matter analytically as many sciences do. One wants to find and under-
stand the fundamental mechanisms and principles that provoke and govern the phenomenon
of interest. This reductionist approach aims to explain human experience and behaviour with
a limited set of underlying, causal factors. Regarding the human cognitive system, this ap-
proach leads to a modular architecture in which it is assumed that the human mind consists of
modules that are informationally encapsulated. That is, the modules are impenetrable (i.e.,
domain specific & autonomous), quick and have specialised cognitive functions (Coltheart,
1999). Such a modularity was prominently proposed by Fodor (1983, for further discus-
sion, see Fodor, 2000), specifically for sensory-perceptual and cognitive (at least linguistic)
processing levels (but see Sperber, 1994, for an extension beyond these domains).
The modularity hypothesis has a high explanatory value and can accommodate a num-
ber of findings. For example, the relationship among given brain structures and cognitive
8The separate processing of these features, as proposed, e.g., in the feature integration theory (Treisman, & Gelade,
1980; Kahneman, Treisman, & Gibbs, 1992), leads to the so-called binding problem, the question how processing in distant
neural populations or circuits can lead to a united experience.
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functions or (double) dissociations of behavioural-brain functions support the modularity
hypothesis (Dunn, & Kirsner, 2003). Regarding language, Fodor (1983) pointed out that, for
example, comprehension is such a specific function that it is very likely to be informationally
encapsulated, i.e., independent of other cognitive domains. This is because lexical compre-
hension is essentially a many-to-one mapping, that is, a vast number of stimuli, written (in
different handwritings or prints) or spoken (in various speeds or emotional states) etc., have
to activate one and only one lexical representation (associated with the given word). It is also
in line with various areas and sections of the motor system that are functionally separable,
at least one can relate different anatomical structures with different functions. In contrast,
it is difficult to imagine how a strongly opposing perspective (strict non-modularity) would
incorporate findings from the cognitive neuroscience for the whole cognitive system (but see
Mesulam, 1990). It appears that some version of modularity is necessary as many findings
are difficult to reconcile with a strictly non-modular architecture.
A weaker version of the modularity hypothesis could be seen in some of the recent em-
bodiment frameworks. In these approaches, it is suggested that cognitive functions are rooted
in more concrete body control functions, i.e., sensory-perceptual and motor systems (Mete-
yard, Cuadrado, Bahrami, & Vigliocco, 2012; Wilson, 2002; Clark, 1999). For example,
word representations which are symbolic representations involve also neuroanatomic parts
of the (sensori)motor system (e.g., Hauk, Johnsrude, & Pulvermu¨ller, 2004; Chwilla, Kolk, &
Vissers, 2007; Ru¨schemeyer, Brass, & Friederici, 2007; Fischer, & Zwaan, 2008; Van Dam,
Rueschemeyer, & Bekkering, 2010). Such findings support the view that higher cognitive or
symbolic representation, such as language, are partly supported by modality-specific neural
systems (Glenberg, & Kaschak, 2002; Rizzolatti, & Arbib, 1998).
It should be noted, however, that strong and weaker versions of the modularity hypothe-
sis lead to fundamental questions; strong versions face contradictory evidence regarding the
impenetrability of perceptual functions and weaker versions suffer from reduced explanatory
value as they reduce or give up the independence of modules (Stokes, & Bergeron, 2015).
Also, theories diverge broadly regarding the degree of embodiment (Clark, 1999; Gentsch,
Weber, Synofzik, Vosgerau, & Schu¨tz-Bosbach, 2016). Independent of such criticism, a
modular perspective of the cognitive system may contribute to a theoretical fragmentation
of psychological phenomena. Various cognitive domains or psychological phenomena are
investigated independently and may, consequently, be believed to be also functionally in-
dependent and separable. For example, by using a factor analytic approach, Carroll (1993)
distinguishes ten cognitive domains with more than a dozen cognitive factors for each of the
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language and the psychomotor domains.9 Hence, the unity of psychological phenomena as
given in subjective experience may be questioned fundamentally.
One may also see a practical fragmentation of psychological research on an institutional
level into a multitude of disciplines devoted to specific psychological fields. Assuming a
theoretical independence, such an organisation may also (implicitly) question the unity of
the subject matter. However, with recently developed techniques and nowadays conceptual
and methodological advances, an integrated approach to understand also the interplay among
cognitive domains should be promising.
Unfortunately, there is no straightforward solution in sight at present. Maybe the bor-
ders of strong modularity have to be pushed back to sensory processing for structural neu-
roanatomic reasons (e.g., separate pathways of the sensory modalities). After sensory pro-
cessing, interactions among cognitive domains may have to be accepted to some extent. For
some functions (e.g., executive functions or attention) this seems to be mandatory. However,
evidence for independence of some functions such as double dissociations cannot be denied.
Finally, there is the principled possibility that the processing configuration is flexible, i.e.,
task or context dependent. That is, the cognitive processing mechanisms might be adapted
to current demands on behaviour.
Two research fields that, obviously, need integration are language comprehension and
production. Presumably, theoretical progress does not yet permit a fully integrated theory.
There have been some attempts of an integrated view (Price, 1998; Coltheart, Rastle, Perry,
Langdon, & Ziegler, 2001; Bock, Dell, Chang, & Onishi, 2007; Price, 2010) but mostly
an integrated approach was important in neuropsychology as language tests often include
reading aloud or word repetition, that is, tasks that involve both comprehension and produc-
tion (Luzzatti, & De Bleser, 1996; Bormann, & Weiller, 2012; Jarema, Perlak, & Semenza,
2007; Chiarelli, Menichelli, & Semenza, 2006).
Another phenomenon where both comprehension and production are essential is transla-
tion (e.g., de Groot, 1992; Green, 1998; Kroll, van Hell, Tokowicz, & Green, 2010). Some
models of translation claim an asymmetry between bilingual lexical access (Grosjean, 2000
but see Paulmann, Elston-Gu¨ttler, Gunter, & Kotz, 2006) and translation directions (between
native, L1, and second language, L2 Kroll, & Stewart, 1994). Accordingly, word translation
from L1 to L2 is assumed to be conceptually mediated, i.e., involving lexical meaning rep-
resentations. In contrast, translation from L2 to L1 is assumed to be mediated by associative
links between L2 and L1 word forms. That is, L2 to L1 translation would not activate the
meaning representation (or only with a considerable delay). As this hypothesis was based
9Carroll (1993) conceives of the factors as corresponding to real effective functions of the human cognitive system, not
as ”merely mathematical artifacts” (p. 642) although some factors may be correlated.
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on behavioural data (reaction times), more sensitive measures such as ERPs can help to test
the semantic processing in both translations directions. To this end, we performed a single
word translation study (Christoffels, Ganushchak, & Koester, 2013) in which we investi-
gated the temporal unfolding of translation processes by using ERPs. In this study, a similar
N400 effect, as a marker of lexical-semantic activation (Van Petten, & Luka, 2006), was
found for both translation directions. The latency of the N400 effects did not differ between
translation directions either. Thus, it was concluded, as one result, that both translation di-
rections involve conceptual mediation. More generally, this study makes a contribution to
the integration of the research fields of language production and comprehension.
Taken together, it is suggested that the human cognitive system and its neural underpin-
nings are characterised by some correlations between functions and anatomical structures,
that is, it shows at least some degree of modularity. At the same time, it has to be acknowl-
edged that not all research fields or cognitive domains are independent even if the current
state-of-the-art of science treats them independently; such a situation may rather reflect the
current stage of theory development. Hierarchical processing and representations may be
found in multiple, if not all, cognitive domains and, thus, provide a connecting principle
for understanding and explaining human behaviour. Before discussing some integrative re-




In this chapter I will discuss briefly some aspects of the publications that pertain most closely
to action control or, more generally, to human behaviour. Needless to say, human behaviour
cannot exhaustively be described as muscle activity. Instead, behaviour is also influenced
by cognitive (e.g., goals or anticipations) and even sensory processes (as in sensorimotor
control; e.g., Prinz, 1987; Jeannerod, 1985; Rosenbaum et al., 1990; Schack, 1999; Prinz
et al., 2013). In Koester and Schack (2014, p. 595), we have suggested a wide character-
isation of human behaviour (i.e., responses) as ”any reaction of the organism to external or
internal events” (see Fig. 2.1; cf. also Janke, & Kallus, 1995; Prinz, 1990). As we pursue
an action-centred and (action) effect-related approach (e.g., Mechsner, Kerzel, Knoblich, &
Prinz, 2001; Prinz, 1990; Marken, 1986), we would like to emphasise that behaviour can be
seen as manifold responses. Such responses can occur on various levels of body function
and may be classified as overt vs. covert responses, although these organisational principles
are not completely independent.
Overt and covert responses can be distinguished by the possibility of direct observations
of movements by an outside observer. Overt responses involve some form of movement
which can range from gross body movements to minor, subtle movements, even inside the
body. For example, a response of the cardiovascular system may result in an increased
heart rate or blood pressure and, thereby, be observed in a blushing reaction (change in skin
colouration). In contrast, covert responses are understood as internal information process-
ing with an emphasis on the psychological system for the present purpose. These covert
responses can only indirectly be measured.
As indicated in Figure 2.1, overt and covert responses are supported in parts by the cen-
tral nervous system (CNS). The CNS activity can further be differentiated into specific
(e.g., the motor system) and unspecific nervous subsystems (i.e., attention system). As we
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are interested in the cognitive system, it is of interest how such CNS activity can be eval-
uated. Here, we pointed out that not only central measures (e.g., EEG/ERPs, fMRI, near
infra-red spectroscopy, transcranial magnetic stimulation, intracortical recording, etc.) are
available but peripheral measurements can be equally informative (e.g., responses of the
eye—movements, scan paths, changes in pupil size—electromyography, electrocardiogram,



















Figure 2.1: Humans can respond in multiple ways (multiple response systems) to external or internal
events. Responses can be classified grossly into overt and covert responses which are both partly
subserved by the central nervous system (CNS). Within the CNS, specific and unspecific systems can
be distinguished.
Another, maybe more common classification of human behaviour is a continuum from
automatic, reflex-like to voluntary, intentionally-induced actions (cf: Herwig, & Waszak,
2009). Voluntary movements which are characterised as goal-directed behaviour (Hommel,
2008; Konczak, 2008, for overviews) have been addressed mostly by theories in the tradi-
tion of the ideomotor approach in which anticipations of movements effects play a critical
role in the initiation and regulation of movement executions. Such cognitive approaches to
movement (e.g., Jeannerod, 2006) often contrast with dynamical system approaches which
try to explain movements with properties of the body and, to various extent, of the envi-
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ronment, that is, also without internal models (Wolpert, Ghahramani, & Jordan, 1995; Beer,
2000; Ijspeert, Nakanishi, & Schaal, 2002). It should also be noted that cognitive control is
not required for all complex movements (e.g., postural control or walking), specifically spinal
control and muscle synergies (D’Avella, & Bizzi, 1998; Poppele, & Bosco, 2003; Debicki,
& Gribble, 2005). This is to say, the present focus on cognitive processes is not intended to
de-emphasise other levels such as sensorimotor control (e.g., Kawato, 1999; Todorov, 2004).
There are models that target more specifically the control of movements. For example,
internal motor models try to explain complex movement by relaying sensory information
through some algorithms to motor commands. A reasonable algorithm would then hold not
only for one specific movement but for a whole class of movements. Such internal models of-
fer a good explanation for motor learning (cf: Konczak, 2008). Another successful approach
is Schmidt’s theory of generalised motor programmes (GMP) which partly builds on Keele’s
more concrete motor programmes of muscle activity (Schmidt, 1975; Keele, 1968). Schmidt
assumes that only invariant movement parameters are stored and not concrete muscle com-
mands. Hence, one GMP can explain why humans can execute some (learned) movements
similarly with different effectors (e.g., writing one’s own name). Some of the present work
relates to the cognitive action architecture approach (CAAA; Schack, 2010; Schack, Schu¨tz,
Krause, & Seegelke, 2016) which proposes four level of control and representation for move-
ment control (see Tab. 2.1). A related concept has been suggested by Bernstein in 1947 (cf:
Feigenberg, 2014; Bernstein, 1975) assumed an architecture of motor control that ranged
across levels from involuntary to voluntary movements.1
Table 2.1: The levels of control and representation in the cognitive action architecture approach
(CAAA) approach (Schack et al., 2016).




















1The importance of other principle of action control such as the re-afference principle, effects response selection, move-
ment complexity, Fitts’ law, stimulus-response compatibility or response-effect compatibility are acknowledged but are not
focussed here.
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The CAAA approach is concerned with the representation and the control of (complex)
movements, no matter whether the whole body is involved (e.g., in a tennis serve) or only
parts of it (e.g., in manual actions). This approach follows the ideomotor approach in that
it also assumes bi-directional links between movements and their perceptual effects. In this
model, four levels are distinguished; two for mental vs. sensorimotor representations and
two for mental vs. sensorimotor control. An overview is given in Table 2.1 (Schack, 2004).
Sensorimotor control (level I) refers to reflex-like processes of motor control whereas sen-
sorimotor representation (level II) is concerned with sensory-perceptual information incl.
the current of intended body states. The level III (mental representation) houses the cogni-
tive specification for particular movements or classes of movements, and the level of mental
control (IV) carries out symbolic or strategic movement planning and execution.
Of particular interest is the movement representation (level III). An optimal movement
representation reflects the biomechanical demands and the functional structure of the (com-
plex) movement itself (e.g., a tennis serve) which consists of several and separate movement
sub phases (i.e., pre activation, strike & final swing phases Schack, & Mechsner, 2006). A
movement representation comprises its constituents, that is, basic action concepts (BACs,
e.g., bending knee, bending elbow or racket acceleration, etc.) and the relationship among
the BACs. In an optimal movement representation, the BACs are grouped together according
to their function (often corresponding to sub phase). For example, the BACs bending knee
and bending elbow would be grouped together (with further BACs) to represent the move-
ment sub phase pre activation which has the function to generate energy and to prepare the
main phase (strike). In contrast, those groups of BACs that contribute to different movement
sub phases (i.e., different functions), are kept separated or, in other words, are not associ-
ated (the BACs racket acceleration & bending knee in the example). The BACs themselves
are assumed to bind together the sensory/perceptual features (e.g., visual, proprioceptive
or vestibular) and the motor features of a given movement part (e.g., motor commands for
movements and for stabilisation) for a function of a sub movement. That is, a(n optimal)
movement representation is conceived of as a hierarchically organised structure of mem-
ory content where the structure of the representation reflects the optimal biomechancial and
functional movement structure. These movement representations can be measured objec-
tively with the so-called structural dimensional analysis—motor (SDA-M; Schack, 2004).
We have used this method to investigate cognitive aspects of expertise in indoor climb-
ing (Bla¨sing, Gu¨ldenpenning, Koester, & Schack, 2014) as a specific form of manual
action control. To investigate expertise, novices and athletes (i.e., climbers) were tested in
a cross-sectional design. The study employed two methods in an integrative effort to relate
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processing and representation of grasp-related climbing knowledge. These methods were a
classical priming paradigm and the SDA-M, respectively.
The SDA-M consists, in principle, of four analysis steps. First, participants undergo a
splitting procedure during which they are presented with all stimuli pairwise. The stimuli
are usually the basic action concepts; in our case there were 16 pictures of different climbing
holds for four (appropriate) grip types. Participants perform exhaustive pairwise compar-
isons (i.e., related-unrelated judgements) regarding the similarity of the two BACs. In our
study, participants had to indicate whether the two grasping holds require the same grip or
not. This splitting procedure yields a distance scaling among BACs. Second, a hierarchi-
cal cluster analysis performed to obtain structural relation among BACs, and, third, a factor
analysis is use to reveal the dimensions of the cluster structure. In a fourth step the cluster
solution for an individual or a group of participants can be tested against a reference structure
(e.g., of an expert) or against one another. There is a distance criterion dcrit corresponding to
the statistical significance level a, below which BACs are interpreted to be associated and to
represent a particular movement phase or, in the present case, a particular grip type. Overall,
the SDA-M provides psychometric data on the cognitively represented structure of complex
movements. For further methodological and mathematical details, see Schack (2012).
Figure 2.2: Cognitive representations of climbing holds for the athlete group (left panel) and the
novice group (right panel) The red, horizontal line indicates the critical values dcrit = 3.4.
In our climbing study, we used the SDA-M to evaluate how the cognitive representa-
tions of climbing holds are structured, and we applied a visual priming paradigm using holds
as primes and grasping postures as targets in order to evaluate the processing of grip rep-
resentations (Bla¨sing et al., 2014). The same participants underwent both procedures to
ensure comparability. For the cognitive representations, see Figure 2.2; the cluster structure
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is shown in a tree-like diagrams. All holds are indicated separately on the x-axis (associated
with different grips, formally BACs), and the y-axis represents the distance (or similarity) of
the BACs. For athletes (Fig. 2.2, left panel), the BACs are represented as four clusters as can
be seen from the (four) branches that cross the criterion of a critical distance (dcrit). These
four clusters of grasps for the athletes correspond correctly to the four grip types2 used in
this study. This result suggests that athletes categorise climbing grasps appropriately and
that their cognitive representation of grip types corresponds to a functional organisation.
Novices, in contrast, show a fundamentally different pattern (see Fig. 2.2, right panel).
Many BACs (grips) are unordered (i.e., they are apparently not associated with other grips).
This is indicated by the BACs’ branches crossing the criterion before forming a node with an-
other BAC. For the novice group, three clusters were found. However, these clusters did not
represent functional similarity of grips but superficial features of the holds (possibly shape
or colour). This result suggests that novices do not represent grasp holds according action
functionality. Together with the results from the athletes, it was suggested that the different
structures of climbing knowledge reflects the difference in expertise with the subject matter
(Hoffmann, 2003). Hence, it may be speculated that experience with objects influences the
way how these objects are represented on a cognitive level.
Furthermore, we asked whether such differences in representation would affect behav-
ioural responses (Bla¨sing et al., 2014). In the priming experiment, we paired not only holds
(as primes) and grasping postures (as targets) that were adequate (i.e., congruent) or in-
congruent but we also included neutral holds which should not interact with the grasping
postures. If the class of climbing hold representations do affect activation and selection of
grip types (participants had to classify the target picture as crimp grip or sideways pull),
athletes should show a response congruency effect, that is, faster processing of congruent
vs. incongruent hold-grip pairs. Novices should not show a comparable result pattern or no
effect at all. This prediction was actually borne out. Not only did we find a congruency
effect for athletes. Moreover, we could show that congruent hold-grip pairs led to facilita-
tion (relative to the neutral condition) and also incongruent hold-grip pairs led to inhibitory
processing (again vs. neutral). This priming effect is in accordance with the observation
that the perception of (manipulable) objects activates the associated actions (as measured
by priming Labeye, Oker, Badard, & Versace, 2008). Novices showed no congruency ef-
fect.3 Taken together, it is suggested that action experience with specific objects structures
the cognitive representations according to the action possibilities (SDA-M result), and these
functionally structured object representations are used for further action organisation (prim-
2The grip types were: crimp grip, sideways pull, pocket grip and an open grip.
3In fact, novices responded faster in the neutral compared to the other conditions.
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ing exp.). This interpretation is supported by better recall performance in expert climbers
compared to novices for difficult climbing routes that has been suggested to reflect superior
formation of motor chunks (Pezzulo, Barca, Bocconi, & Borghi, 2010). Similar to our study,
experts seem to have functionally appropriate, cognitive organisation of climbing knowledge.
This finding is interesting for the CAAA approach because it suggests a specification of
processing mechanisms within the level of mental representations (III) at least for manual
actions. Briefly, for many situations, very fast action planning and execution is optimal
(e.g., catching a falling cup). By experience one might reduce the almost infinite number of
actions (towards an object) by forming action categories or grip types in the above example.
Hence, relevant objects may upon perception activate appropriate action categories. Such
an activation does not solve the problem of selection as more than one action category may
be appropriate (or objects may be ambiguous). That is, multiple action categories may be
activated to a similar degree. Given the interference effect in our climbing study, one could
be tempted to argue that among action categories there is a mutual inhibition in analogy
to the well-known mechanism of lateral inhibition (Blakemore, Carpenter, & Georgeson,
1970; Blakemore, & Tobin, 1972) which has also been applied to cognitive levels (e.g.,
Berg, & Schade, 1992; Shallice, 1972; Wheeldon, & Monsell, 1994) and action selection
(Shallice, 1972, for a general role of cognitive competition, see Rosenbaum, 2014). That is,
more strongly activated action categories (or grip types) would inhibit less activated action
categories, thereby speeding up action selection. Lateral inhibition here can be understood
as a suppression of competing action categories (i.e., of grip types) and might be considered
as a form of reactive inhibition (Johnson, & Proctor, 2004). Along these lines, our results
(Bla¨sing et al., 2014) can contribute to theory development (of action control) by specifying
within level mechanisms and provide evidence for a beneficial combination of methods.
To extend our understanding of action control to underlying, biological possibly causal
factors, further methods can provide valuable insight. Manual action, specifically grasping
and reaching have been investigated with various neuroscientific methods, incl. animal stud-
ies (e.g., Rizzolatti, Camarda, Fogassi, Gentilucci, Luppino, & Matelli, 1988; Jeannerod,
Arbib, Rizzolatti, & Sakata, 1995) but the generalisation to humans is not without problems
(Castiello, 2005; Husain, & Nachev, 2007). In normal healthy humans, behavioural (e.g., ob-
servation or kinematic measurements), neuropsychological approaches and fMRI have been
predominantly used. However, understanding the fast processes of action control in healthy
humans would greatly benefit from neuroscience methods with high temporal resolution. A
recent methodological extension for manual action control was the measurement of ERPs
which had been avoided for fear of movement artefacts.
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Despite potential movement artefacts, Kirsch and Hennighausen (2010) reported ERP
effects for arm movements and Van Schie and Bekkering (2007) for grasp execution. The
latter authors reported data for precision grips; in particular, effects in motor potentials over
the parietal cortex before grasping an object and over the left frontal cortex before placing
the object on the target position. Bozzacchi et al. (2012) investigated also precision grips and
analysed the readiness potential (RP). These authors found an earlier RP over parietal areas
and a later RP onset over frontal areas. Parietal effects have been suggested to reflect the
specification of grip-related information that is further processed in frontal areas (Bozzacchi
et al., 2012). While the temporal succession of effects is similar in these two grasping studies,
it remains to be shown whether the ERP effects reflect the same functional mechanisms.
Recently, the work by Van Schie and Bekkering (2007, grasp-and-place task) was extended
to power grips (Westerholz, Schack, & Koester, 2013) and the ERP methodology was also
applied to a grasp-and-rotate task (Westerholz, Schack, Schu¨tz, & Koester, 2014) in further
grasping experiments.
Notably, grasping actions have been related functionally to other cognitive domains such
as (working) memory or attention (see Ch. 4. In line with a hierarchical perspective, grasping
is not only influenced by physical variables (e.g., shape, weight, orientation, position, etc.,
e.g., Castiello, 2005; Desmurget, Prablanc, Arzi, Rossetti, Paulignan, & Urquizar, 1996) but
also by cognitive variables (e.g., goals, intentions or anticipations, e.g., Herbort, & Butz,
2010; Kunde, Landgraf, Paelecke, & Kiesel, 2007; Rosenbaum, Marchak, Bames, Vaughan,
Siotta, & Jorgensen, 1990) and habitual factors for action control (Herbort, & Butz, 2011;
Logan, 2009).
The potential of neuroscience methods (with a further focus on attention) has been out-
lined specifically for movement and sport science (Essig, Janelle, Borgo, & Koester, 2014).
Although attention is critically involved in manual actions such as grasping (Baldauf, &
Deubel, 2010; Hesse, & Deubel, 2011) and may have a relevant role in mediating between
motor and perceptual processes (Kirsch, 2015), it should be noted that different functions (or
movement parts, such as reaching vs. grasping) or different effectors (e.g., eye and its sac-
cades vs. hand) may be differently affected by attentional processes (Deubel, & Schneider,
2003).
Here, I would like to stress again the high potential that neuroscience methods, especially
ERPs, bear for movement science and our understanding of action control possibly in com-
bination with other approaches (e.g., expertise approach) or further methods (such as eye
movements; Essig et al., 2014). Another cognitive domain where ERPs proved particularly
valuable is language processing to which I will turn now.
Chapter 3
Language processing
Regarding language processing, some of my work has been devoted to amend our under-
standing of lexical processes, in particular the processing of compound words which are
concatenations of words (free morphemes, to be precise). One prevailing question in lan-
guage production concerns the status of morphology (i.e., the structure of words); whether
it is psychologically real or an epiphenomenon (i.e., emergent from other factors, e.g., se-
mantics and phonology). Structured processing of compounds is less controversial in com-
prehension but some theoretical positions seem inconsistent, and the present project will be
provided new evidence in support of structured rather than holistic auditory comprehension
of compounds. Prosodic and orthotactic (letter combinations) information will be suggested
to provide cues for adjusting the parsing of compound words.
3.1 Production
As said, some have argued that morphological effects are simply a by-product of semantic
and phonological processing (cf: sec. 1.2 Joanisse, & Seidenberg, 1999; Plaut, & Gonner-
man, 2000, but see Pinker, & Prince, 1988; Pinker, 1991). This position is mostly promoted
by neural network approaches and is also consistent with graded ERP effects of lexical-
semantic processing (Morris, Frank, Grainger, & Holcomb, 2007; Gonnerman, Seidenberg,
& Andersen, 2007). However, if one compares the brain responses to the very same words
in different conditions (e.g., morphologically primed vs. not primed), any effects cannot be
due to differently processing of semantic or phonological information.
In Koester and Schiller (2008), we followed this rationale for investigating the mor-
phological processing during overt speech1 (picture naming, a common task in language
1For other modalities, e.g., writing see Bertram et al. (2015; Damian, Dorjee, & Stadthagen-Gonzalez, 2011; Perret, &
Laganaro, 2011).
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production research). In this ERP study, we aimed to measure the timing of morphological
processing (onset & duration) by means of ERPs. The continuous nature of ERPs is one of
their advantages, next to their high temporal resolution. In a previous meta-analytic study
of language production (Indefrey, & Levelt, 2004), morphological processing (arising at the
stage of word form encoding) should begin around 330ms after picture presentation; this
estimate assumes an average response latency of 600ms.
To exclude semantic and phonological influences, two methodological measures were
taken. Briefly, a long-lag priming paradigms was used in which prime and target stimuli are
separated by 7–10 intervening trials. For this paradigm it was shown that neither semantic
nor phonological priming effects (nor interference effects) survive such a distance between
primes and targets (Feldman, 2000; Zwitserlood et al., 2000). This paradigm has also been
used successfully for compound production (Dohmes et al., 2004). As a second measure
to control for semantic and phonological effects, three experimental conditions were con-
structed that varied in their prime-target relations. Primes (compound words, to be read out
loud) could be morphologically and semantically related to the targets (pictures), the rela-
tion could be morphologically but not semantically related and, finally, the primes and targets
could be phonologically related but neither morphologically nor semantically (see Tab. 3.1).
These conditions are labelled transparent, opaque and form-related, respectively. There was
also an unrelated condition as a baseline.2 Again, the same targets were used in all conditions
and if morphological priming is effective, the following pattern should be found. Regarding
the ERPs, the N400 component is expected to be modulated in its amplitude as the N400
shows a sensitivity to morphological processing (McKinnon, Allen, & Osterhout, 2003).
Table 3.1: The relationships among the experimental conditions and lexical processes in Koester, &
Schiller (2008; 2011). Ticks represent a positive relationship. Together with the characteristics of
the long-lag priming paradigm, the various comparisons permit conclusions about morphological
processing; see text.
Condition
Relation Transparent Opaque Form-related Unrelated
Morphological X X - -
Semantic X - - -
Phonological X X X -
If there is true morphological processing one can expect the following effect pattern.
Transparent and opaque conditions should both yield a priming effect relative to the unre-
2Conditions were distributed across two sets of stimuli as it was not possible to construct all conditions within one set.
3.1. PRODUCTION 29
lated condition as both are morphologically related. Moreover, these two conditions should
show a comparable effect because semantic information should not be effective in a long-lag
paradigm. In contrast, if any priming effect would reflect semantic processes, the priming
effect for transparent should be greater than for opaque because only transparent primes
are, in principle, semantically related to the targets. Regarding phonology, the form-related
condition (e.g., ”trombone”! bone as a picture) should not yield a priming effect because
primes and targets are not morphologically related. Generally, the transparent and opaque
conditions should pattern together, also the form-related and the unrelated conditions should
pattern together, if only morphology is effective in the long-lag paradigm.
These expectations were confirmed in behavioural and in ERP measures (N400 Koester,
& Schiller, 2008). The N400 effect for the transparent and the opaque conditions are repro-
duced as an example in Figure 3.1 (left panel); the unrelated condition shows a more nega-
tive ERP amplitude between 350 and 650ms than the transparent and the opaque conditions
which do not differ from one another. This pattern of results has a bearing on the psycho-
logical reality of morphological processes as these effects cannot be explained by semantic
or phonological factors. That is, these support theories of language production that include
morphological processing (e.g., Levelt, Roelofs, & Meyer, 1999; Schriefers, Zwitserlood, &













Figure 3.1: Event-related potentials for morphological priming effects during language production
(left panel; from Koester & Schiller, 2008) and semantic integration (filled arrow) and re-structuring
effects (blank arrow) during language comprehension (right panel; from Koester et al., 2009).
Regarding the timing of morphological processing (i.e., word form encoding), the onset
of the ERP effects matches the estimate by Indefrey and Levelt (2004) closely. The average
response latency in our ERP study was 652ms. Indefrey and Levelt estimated word form en-
coding to begin around 330ms after picture onset for an average response latency of 600ms.
If this figure is scaled to a response latency of 650ms as in our case, word form encoding
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is expected to begin around 358ms. This matches nicely with our morphological priming
effect between 350 and 650ms. That is, our results (N400; Koester, & Schiller, 2008)
confirm the psychological reality of morphological processing and support the temporal es-
timates for these cognitive processes by Indefrey and Levelt (2004) for language production.
More generally, our findings complement (ERP) studies on language production that used
delayed or covert speaking (e.g., Jescheniak, Schriefers, Garrett, & Friederici, 2002) or re-
quire meta-linguistic decisions (e.g., Schmitt, & Mu¨nte, 2000; Van Turennout, Hagoort, &
Brown, 1997).
Importantly, the just described study makes a seemingly relevant methodological contri-
bution in showing that reliable ERPs can be analysed even if participants make (non-delayed)
movement or, more generally, commit motor reactions. There is hardly any work that com-
bines overt movements with the analysis of ERPs (but see Christoffels, Firk, & Schiller,
2007, from the same lab; Van Schie, & Bekkering, 2007). Interestingly, for spoken lan-
guage, the source of muscle artefacts can hardly get closer to the brain, and yet reliable ERPs
are feasible. To the best of my knowledge, Koester and Schiller (2008) report the first cog-
nitive, N400 ERP component for overt movement executions. For a visual impression of
the signal-to-noise ratio, compare the ERP waveforms for non-delayed spoken production in
Figure 3.1 (left panel) with the ERP waveforms for auditory language comprehension in the
same figure (right panel with delayed button-press responses; cf. 3.2).
Whereas ERPs are appropriate to evaluate temporal characteristics of neurocognitive pro-
cessing, fMRI is more suited to evaluate the spatial aspects of functional neuroanatomy.
Using the same experimental approach to morphological processing as just described, we in-
vestigated also the functional neuroanatomy of morphology in spoken language production
(Koester, & Schiller, 2011). Following the meta-analysis by Indefrey and Levelt (2004), one
would expect that morphological priming affects neural activity in the left posterior superior
and middle temporal gyri (see also Roelofs, 2008). However, when comparing the transpar-
ent and the opaque conditions with the neural activation for the unrelated condition, both
morphologically related condition elicited an increase activation in the left inferior frontal
gyrus (LIFG), specifically in Brodmann area (BA) 47; no conclusive effect was seen for the
form-related condition (Koester, & Schiller, 2011). Although this finding is inconsistent
with Indefrey and Levelt (2004), it does corroborate fMRI evidence for derivational process-
ing which also reports an involvement of BA 47 (Bozic, Marslen-Wilson, Stamatakis, Davis,
& Tyler, 2007; Meinzer, Lahiri, Flaisch, Hannemann, & Eulitz, 2009). More generally,
our finding is consistent with morphology and morphosyntax being supported by the LIFG
(Marangolo, Piras, Galati, & Burani, 2006; Marslen-Wilson, & Tyler, 1998; Tyler, deMor-
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nay Davies, Anokhina, Longworth, Randall, & Marslen-Wilson, 2002; Ullman, 2001; Laine,
Rinne, Krause, Tera¨s, & Sipila¨, 1999) even though BA 47 is not part of Broca’s area proper.
Taken together, our contributions to the area of language production support the temporal
estimates of morphological processing in language production but the investigation of the
functional neuroanatomy calls for further inquiries into the spoken production of structured
words.
3.2 Comprehension
Regarding compound comprehension, the structured processing and accordingly the lexical
representations, is accepted in many models (i.e., full-parsing & dual-route models). Full-
parsing models assume that only morphemes are stored but not the complex words or com-
pounds. Complex words are processed by combining the stored morphemes (e.g., Fiorentino,
Naito-Billen, Bost, & Fund-Reznicek, 2014; Taft, 2004; McKinnon et al., 2003; Levelt et al.,
1999; Taft, & Forster, 1976). Dual-route models3 assume a direct processing route and a
decompositional route. The direct route processes whole word forms whereas the decom-
positional route is supposed to retrieve the individual morphemes (e.g., Caramazza, Lau-
danna, & Romani, 1988; Sandra, 1990; Zwitserlood, 1994; Baayen, Dijkstra, & Schreuder,
1997; Schreuder, Neijt, Van der Weide, & Baayen, 1998, Koester et al., 2004; Fiorentino,
& Poeppel, 2007). Only full-listing models assume the storage of whole compounds in ad-
dition to the representations of constituents as separate words (Butterworth, 1983; Bybee,
1995; Janssen, Bi, & Caramazza, 2008).
In order to understand a compound, that is, to create a semantic representation, one has
to take into account the structure of the compound (unless it is represented in itself, e.g., for
very frequent compounds). In German, the last constituent determines the semantic category
of the whole compound and is, therefore, crucial for understanding. (It is called the head.)
Given that the head has a central role in defining the compound’s meaning, it seems possible
that the comprehension system (parser) waits for this critical constituent by using, for ex-
ample, prosodic cues in the auditory modality (see also below). This idea has been proposed
with strong empirical support from a number of behavioural experiments (cross-modal prim-
ing Isel, Gunter, & Friederici, 2003). That is, the parser is assumed to change its processing
configuration upon detecting a (spoken) compound word and to wait with the semantic in-
tegration (i.e., composition of meaning) until the head is perceived. Specifically, Isel et al.,
3As related position is taken by multiple route models which are a recent theoretical contribution that assumes that all
reliable morphological cues are used for parsing (Kuperman, Schreuder, Bertram, & Baayen, 2008; Marelli, & Luzzatti,
2012).
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(2003) reported no semantic activation of non-head constituents before the head constituent
was heard. In control experiments, it was shown that this was not an artefact of the specific
stimuli; when the non-head constituents were changed in prosody to indicate single nouns
(non-compounds), semantic activation was obtained.
In order to test this claim regarding the time course of semantic processing in auditory
compound comprehension, we resorted to a continuous, possibly more sensitive measure
(ERPs). In two studies, we tested for semantic processing before the head was presented,
that is, while a non-head constituent was still being presented (Koester, Holle, & Gunter,
2009; Holle, Gunter, & Koester, 2010).
First, we tested for lexical-semantic access of initial constituents which should be delayed
according to the account by Isel et al. (2003). To this end, compounds were constructed that
could contain pseudomorphemic foil constituents (e.g., ”Patose.schlot,” *patose chimney)
either in the first or in the second constituent position. Foil constituents were created from
nouns that were appropriate in the according compound position. All foils adhered to Ger-
man phonological rules and were matched closely to their (word) counterparts. Participants
had to listen for understanding and perform a semantic judgement task (comparison to sub-
sequently presented visual test words). If lexical-semantic access is indeed postponed until
the head is available, the ERPs for initial foil constituents should not differ from initial noun
constituents. In contrast, if lexical-semantic processing is an incremental process, an N400
effect was expected. Indeed, such an N400 effect was found (500–700ms after stimulus
onset; Holle et al., 2010). Importantly, the initial constituents (c1) had an average duration
of 701ms. (All c1s were composed of three syllables.) Therefore, the N400 effect began
before the head was presented, and it was concluded that lexical-semantic processing is not
delay until the head is perceived. Rather, it seems that lexical-semantic access takes place
incrementally.
Second, another attempt to understand auditory compound comprehension made use of
three-constituent compounds (Koester et al., 2009) which are not investigated very often
(e.g., Inhoff, Radach, & Heller, 2000). In this study, we were interested in semantic integra-
tion among constituents, that is, compositional processes (cf: Bai, Bornkessel-Schlesewsky,
Wang, Hung, Schlesewsky, & Burkhardt, 2008). These are logically necessary if the stimu-
lus has been decomposed. The question was whether such composition is delayed for com-
pounds (Isel et al., 2003) or whether is an incremental process (Pratarelli, 1995; Koester
et al., 2004). To address this question, we constructed three-constituent compound for which
the second constituent (c2) was more or less plausible given the first. For this plausibility
manipulation, independent participants generated c2s in response to c1s. Implausible c2s
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were not produced by any of these participants. The plausibility of the third constituent
was manipulated in the same way with new, independent participants for the rating. Again,
in the experiment proper, participants listened for understanding and performed a semantic
judgement task. The critical comparison concerned the plausibility effect during the c2. If
lexical-semantic processing is delayed, no effect is expected. However, if lexical-semantic
processing is incremental in nature, an N400 effect can be expected which could arise from
the increased semantic integration difficulty for less plausible constituents (c2; e.g., De Long
et al., 2005 Van den Brink, Brown, & Hagoort, 2006). The ERPs showed a clear amplitude
modulation by plausibility (see Fig. 3.1, right panel). Less plausible c2s elicited a greater
N400 with a left-hemispheric dominance between 300 and 500ms after c2 onset. Again, the
head constituent (c3) began on average 370ms after c2. That is, the N440 effect was traced
before c3 was presented. Hence, the lexical-semantic integration of c1 and c2 did not de-
pend on the availability of the head constituents, and it was concluded that lexical-semantic
integration of compounds (composition) proceeds incrementally in the auditory modality.
Furthermore, the plausibility manipulation of c2 in our study elicited a further ERP ef-
fect, namely an increased P600 for less plausible c2s (600–900ms after c2 onset; cf: Kolk,
& Chwilla, 2007; Kuperberg, 2007). This P600 effect takes place during c3 (see Fig. 3.1,
right panel). Although more speculative, it is conceivable that this P600 effect reflects the
re-analysis of the compound structure. If the parser expects initially a two-constituent com-
pound with an A-B structure, B would carry the head role, and a restructuring would be
required when a head constituent is detected. That is, the A-B structure would have to
be changed into AB-C, where B would change its role from a head to a modifier con-
stituent. Such a re-analysis may be more resource-demanding for less plausible compound
constituents, in line with an increased P600 amplitude (Hagoort, Brown, & Groothusen,
1993; Osterhout, & Holcomb, 1992; Friederici, Hahne, & Mecklinger, 1996). This inter-
pretation is also consistent with the observation that there was not P600 effect for c3. As
c3 was always the head constituent, no re-analysis was required and, accordingly, no P600
effect would be expected. Overall, these results (Koester et al., 2009; Holle et al., 2010),
clearly suggest that auditory compound comprehension proceeds incrementally and follows
hierarchical morphological structures (Downing, 1977; Fabb, 2001).
3.2.1 Parsing cues
Here, it can only be speculated why Isel et al. (2003) did not find semantic activation of
initial compound constituents (see above). As said, initial compound constituents and single
nouns (non-compounded) differ in prosody, for example in duration and mean fundamental
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frequency (Vogel, & Raimy, 2002; Isel et al., 2003) and contour of the fundamental frequency
(Koester et al., 2004; Farnetani, Torsello, & Cosi, 1988). Since compound constituents
are shorter than single nouns, processing time may become a critical factor for building up
semantic activation (Zwitserlood, & Schriefers, 1995); shorter durations (for a compound
prosody) might not provide enough processing time for full semantic activation.
Finally, two factors should be mentioned that affect the comprehension of compound
words; one for listening and one for reading. Prosody has been shown to differ for words
that are produced as part of a compound or as a single word. If people are sensitive to these
differences, prosodic cues can be used to change the processing configuration of the parser
(Isel et al., 2003; Koester et al., 2004). That is, prosody might be an assistive cue because it
is not available in reading (or only implicitly) that could be used to control the processing of
word structure and, thus, increase processing flexibility.
Again ERPs were used to test whether the brain’s response changes quantitatively or
qualitatively when processing the same words once with a compound prosody and once
with a single noun prosody (Koester, 2014). To this end, participants listened to determiner
+ nouns constructions and made number agreement judgements and occasionally semantic
judgements for these constructions. Importantly, the critical nouns (1=3 of all stimuli) carried
in 50% of the cases a compound prosody and in 50% a single nouns prosody. These critical
nouns were always followed by white noise that was actually created from an according head
constituent (but this noise constituent was never intelligible). The ERPs were analysed only
for these nouns. To avoid strategic responses, the experiment contained filler items; 1=3 were
single nouns and 1=3 were two-constituent compounds. Neither of the filler nouns contained
any noise. Hence, the processing of the critical stimuli (determiner + noun + noise) should
not be biased towards a(n implicit) single noun or compound interpretation.
The results show a clear qualitative change in the brain response. For the single noun
prosody, number violations4 elicited a left-anterior negativity (LAN, 650–750ms after noun
onset; Koester, 2014) as it is known for morphosyntactic violations (e.g., Barber, & Car-
reiras, 2005; Deutsch, & Bentin, 2001; Gunter, Friederici, & Schriefers, 2000). In contrast,
for the compound prosody, number violations yielded a right-anterior negativity that was de-
layed by about 600ms. That is, the processing of number information was not only slowed
down by the compound prosody but it led also to a distinct scalp topography of the associated
ERP effect. Hence, it was concluded that prosody is an effective cue to compound processing
and that the parsing configuration is flexible in that it is changed when a compound prosody
4The violation paradigm is a standard methodological procedure to test for the temporal processing of specific types of
information. Violations are assumed to disturb the relevant brain processes and, thereby, to strengthen the associated brain
response.
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is detected. This is generally, in line with the assumption of flexible dual-route mechanisms
for the processing of morphologically complex words.
The second factor that may influence the structural processing of compounds relates to
the visual modality. In a word reading study (compounds), the role of orthotactic, that is,
letter combinations (bigrams) was investigated (Lemho¨fer et al., 2011; Libben, 1994; Ras-
tle, Davis, & New, 2004, for derivations). The question was whether or not people use
such orthotactic information. That is, if letter combinations are used for parsing compounds,
one should find an effect of the legality of the two letters forming the morpheme boundary.
For example, the bigram ”sb” does not occur within (Dutch) morphemes. Hence, we asked
whether such ”illegal” bigrams would facilitate compound processing as they may mark the
morpheme boundary or make it more salient. For example, the compound ”fiets.bel” (bicycle
bell) should be easier to process than ”room.ijs” (ice cream) assuming that ”sb” but not ”mi”
marks the boundary (”mi” does occur within Dutch morphemes). Participants performed a
lexical decision task on these stimuli (incl. filler items).
The main result was that the bigram legality of the morpheme boundary affected com-
pound processing as reflected in reaction times. When the orthotactic cues was present (i.e.,
an illegal bigram such as ”sb”), participants were faster (751ms) compared with compounds
that contained no such cue (777ms). Further analyses showed that this effect was only
present for long compounds (more than nine letters) in accordance with previous studies in
Finnish (Bertram, Pollatsek, & Hyo¨na¨, 2004; Bertram, & Hyo¨na¨, 2012, but see Inhoff et
al., 2000). As the orthotactic cue was also effective in non-native speakers of Dutch (see
Lemho¨fer et al., 2011 for details), it can be assumed that the orthotactic cue is generally
used and its usage may be reduced with language proficiency. Native speakers may rep-
resent short compounds indeed holistically. This study points out that not all compounds
are processed in the same way in reading; at least long compounds are decomposed and,
presumably, are processed according to their hierarchical morphological structure.
In conclusion, the work described in this chapter suggests that compound structure af-
fects processing which is in accordance with full-parsing and dual-route models. That is,
brain responses and behavioural measures reflect the structured processing of compound
words which speaks to the psychological reality of morphology. Especially, the production
studies strongly argue for true morphological processing in the cognitive system. For the
comprehension domain, there is evidence for specific processing cues in the auditory and in
the visual modality. These cues seem to affect the way of parsing compounds. That is, the
parser configuration appears to be variable or to consist of more than one way of process-
ing which is in favour of dual-route models. Generally, it is argued that lexical processing
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at least compounding is structured according to hierarchical rules (i.e., morphology) in the
production and in the comprehension domain.
Chapter 4
Domain interactions
The relations among different cognitive domains have been discussed for a long time, es-
pecially perception, language and action (Whorf, 1963; Greenwald, 1970; MacKay, 1987;
Schu¨tz-Bosbach, & Prinz, 2007), but the conceptions of scientific accounts of the cognitive
system incl. the relationship among domains vary broadly (e.g., Clark, 1999; Gentsch et al.,
2016). In contrast to Piaget, Vygotsky assumed that language plays an important role during
development as a driving force, less as a consequence of thinking (Vygotsky, 1971; Duncan,
1995). Vygotsky understood language (inner speech) as a tool for cognitive development.
Such a perspective implies an mutual influence of action and language processes. Of course,
language plays not only a role for the acquisition of an appropriate behavioural repertoire but
language also helps for the acquisition of conceptual knowledge. Language helps to sharpen
concepts by forming categories (i.e., using the same words for similar but non-identical
objects) and to communicate about objects or events (e.g., Hoffmann, 1986). Potentially,
language fulfils a mediating or, maybe better, coordinating function in organising perceived
objects and appropriate actions (and according concepts, e.g., MacKay, 1987) during de-
velopment; vice versa neurocognitive language processing is shaped by experience (Pierce,
Chen, Delcenserie, Genesee, & Klein, 2015). Needless to say, language cannot be the sole
organising factor regarding the cognitive development (see Prinz, 2013, for the importance
of social factors). Besides the domains of motivation, volition, learning, and memory, etc.,
executive functions play an important role (Norman, 1980; Goschke, 2008). In an action
context, for example, goal setting, (task) planning are important as well as attention, predic-
tion, and action monitoring which require, furthermore, working memory. This is not meant
as an exhaustive list but should demonstrate that multiple domain interactions are necessary
for understanding human behaviour.
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In section 1.3 (p. 17), I have pointed out that during translation, language comprehen-
sion and production necessarily interact (Christoffels et al., 2013). But even if language is
regarded as one domain, it does not only need input from other domains during translation
(e.g., from executive functions; Green, 1998) but also in situations where the relevance of
language input may vary. That is, language comprehension may be influenced by the task or
depth of processing (Chwilla, Brown, & Hagoort, 1995; Craik, & Lockhart, 1972); similar
to monitoring processes in language production (Schiller, & Meyer, 2003).
The prediction of upcoming words is a potential mechanism that could affect process-
ing in situations where language is or is not relevant (Wicha, Bates, Moreno, & Kutas,
2003; Van Berkum, Brown, Zwitserlood, Kooijman, & Hagoort, 2005; DeLong, Urbach, &
Kutas, 2005). If prediction as a ”higher” cognitive process (Bubic, Von Cramon, & Schubotz,
2010) is used to control language processing, especially early comprehension stages, one
would need to consider the possibility that language comprehension is not informationally
encapsulated. To answer this question, we tested whether specific (spoken) words in sen-
tences (as picture descriptions) would be predicted if the language input is or is not relevant
to the participant’s task (Schiller, Horemans, Ganushchak, & Koester, 2009).
Using ERPs, we found quantitative but also qualitative processing differences in the ERP
signature. When language was irrelevant to the task, participants showed mainly an N400
effect if the specific words did not match the pictorial content. In contrast, when the lan-
guage was relevant, we found not only a relatively increased N400 effect which indicates
deeper semantic processing but also a very early, additionally occurring phonological mis-
match negativity (PMN). The PMN is known to reflect a mismatch between a perceived and
an expected phoneme (or at least a deviating phonological onset of a word; Connolly, Byrne,
& Dywan, 1995; Conolly, & Phillips, 1994). Such a prediction of upcoming words may be
achieved by means of the language production system (Pickering, & Garrod, 2007), but our
results suggest that such prediction may be context or task dependent (cf: also Rueschemeyer,
Lindemann, van Rooij, van Dam, & Bekkering, 2010, for effects of intentions on language
processing). This finding (Schiller et al., 2009) represents evidence for the influence of a
non-linguistic (maybe domain general) cognitive process, namely prediction, on early lan-
guage comprehension and may, therefore, be difficult to reconcile with informational encap-
sulation of language. Rather, the results are suggestive of a functional interaction between
executive functions such as prediction and language processing. That is, neurophysiological
language processing seems to be task or context dependent.
Another form of domain interaction between language and non-linguistic sequence pro-
cessing would be the sharing of (neural) processing resources for according tasks. Admit-
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tedly, domain interactions or sharing of common resources is difficult to differentiate em-
pirically at present. Keeping this issue in mind, we investigated the visual perception of
non-linguistic events (novel, visual shapes with varying colours & shapes) that followed
two types of rules again using ERPs (Koester, & Prinz, 2007). There was a hierarchical
rule (e.g., for sequences of shapes) and a non-hierarchical, category-restriction rule (e.g., for
colours, but shape and colour were counterbalanced across participants and did not them-
selves affect the main results).
The results are not straightforward. While we found a qualitatively different ERP re-
sponse for hierarchical rule violations (exclusively a P300 modulation) and for category-
restriction violations (P200 and P300 modulation), it was not the case that we obtained ERP
components that are typically found in sentence violation paradigms for semantic or struc-
tural violations (i.e., N400 or LAN/P600). The results suggest that hierarchical rule and
category restriction information is processed separately and that the processing of such se-
quence rules depends differently on short-term and long-termmemory resources (because the
rule had to be stored). The category-restriction violations are thought to draw on short-term
memory resources because these rules change among stimulus sequences. Also, these viola-
tions were easy to process which coincided with an early ERP effect (a P200 modulation). In
contrast, hierarchical rule violations are interpreted to draw on long-term memory resources
as they would not change among sequences (in rough analogy to linguistic, syntactic rules).
As the processing of such hierarchical rule violations was more difficult, we suggested that
the associated P300 reflects access to long-term memory. Generally, the results are in line
with a cognitive architecture that differentiates hierarchically organised sequence rules from
non-hierarchical sequence rules and may, precautiously, suggest a hierarchical distinction
among processing levels (Velichkovsky, 1993).
More interestingly, an fMRI study using the same non-linguistic stimuli yielded evidence
for shared neural resources when processing such hierarchically organised, non-linguistic
event sequences (Bahlmann, Schubotz, Mueller, Koester, & Friederici, 2009). These
non-linguistic stimuli which can hardly be verbalised were used to construct hierarchical
sequences (hierarchical dependency rule) and non-hierarchical sequences (adjacent depen-
dency rule, comparable to the category-restriction rule in Koester, & Prinz, 2007). One
main result in this fMRI study was an increased activity in the pre-SMA1 for processing
of the hierarchical dependency rule compared with the category-restriction rule. The pre-
SMA is known to be involved in sequencing or sequence chunking but not in motor as-
pects (Kennerley, Sakai, & Rushworth, 2004; Isoda, & Tanji, 2004) or temporal adjustment
1Pre-SMA: pre-supplementary motor area
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(Schwartze, Rothermich, & Kotz, 2012). More importantly, we found a similar, increased
activation in Brodmann area (BA) 44 for the hierarchical dependency rule, and BA 44 is
well-known to be involved in language processing (e.g., Miceli, Turriziani, Caltagirone, Ca-
passo, Tomaiuolo, & Caramazza, 2002; Nishitani, Schu¨rmann, Amunts, & Hari, 2004; Heim,
Eickhoff, Friederici, & Amunts, 2009; Sahin, Pinker, Cash, Schomer, & Halgren, 2009). In
fact, it is part of Broca’s area. Given that the sequence events were not verbalised, one can
assume that BA 44 provides neural resources to both non-linguistic sequence processing and
to language processing, as is already known. Hence, non-linguistic sequence and language
processing seem to share partly neural resources, that is, there might be a domain general
processor for the perception of visual sequences (see Koechlin, & Jubault, 2006, for action
sequences) and language (parser; cf. also Greenfield, Nelson, & Saltzman, 1972; Fiebach, &
Schubotz, 2006). We have to await further research to relate the BA 44 and pre-SMA activity
more closely to the ERP results of our sequence processing (Koester, & Prinz, 2007).
Conceivably, there might be computational resources in the neurocognitive system that
is used by multiple domains (e.g., sequence perception, action planning or language pro-
cessing), although this is speculative at present (Vergauwe, Barrouillet, & Camos, 2010).
For example, attention can be seen as a domain general cognitive function (Johnson, &
Proctor, 2004). Regarding action, task, and language, a functional relation during onto-
genetic development has been discussed (see above; Vygotsky, 1971; Pierce et al., 2015).
For manual actions, for example grasping, a mutual influence has been reported on differ-
ent levels such as articulation/phonetics (e.g., Gentilucci, Benuzzi, Bertolani, Daprati, &
Gangitano, 2000; Gentilucci, 2003; Vainio, Schulman, Tiippana, & Vainio, 2013) or concep-
tual processing (e.g., Glenberg, & Kaschak, 2002; Glover, Rosenbaum, Graham, & Dixon,
2004; Lindemann, Stenneken, van Schie, & Bekkering, 2006). A potential explanation of
such a functional relation is often seen in a phylogenetic co-evolution of the manual and the
vocal control systems (e.g., Steklis, & Harnad, 1976; Corballis, 1991; Rizzolatti, & Arbib,
1998; Klix, 1999; Gentilucci, & Corballis, 2006, for review). While there are more studies
that suggest a functional interaction between the action and the language domain, other cog-
nitive domains may also influence action (planning or control) because the whole cognitive
system seems to contribute to behavioural optimisation (e.g., Norman, 1980; Creem, & Prof-
fitt, 2001). Memory is another central domain for action control which has been recognised
already by ancient Greek philosophers and physicians (see Introduction).
Recently, it was shown that working memory (WM) and grasping are not fully inde-
pendent (Weigelt, Rosenbaum, Huelshorst, & Schack, 2009). In a dual-task paradigm, par-
ticipants opened a series of drawers and had to memorise the content of each drawer (one
DOMAIN INTERACTIONS 41
letter per drawer). In subsequent recall, these authors found only a primacy effect but no
recency effect under various conditions. As the recency effect is typically interpreted to
reflect working memory, Weigelt et al. (2009) concluded that the concurrent action task re-
quired working memory resources that were consequently not available for the letter recall
task. While Logan and Fischman (2011, 2015) argued that this disappearance of the re-
cency effect was basically a dual-task effect (basic concurrence costs, as they call it), it was
shown that action planning (for grasping) shares processing resources in a specific way (in-
terference with visuo-spatial but not verbal WM) whereas re-planning shares unspecific WM
resources (interference for both, visuo-spatial and verbal WM Spiegel, Koester, & Schack,
2013). In this study, participants had to grasp a sphere and plan either a leftward or a right-
ward movement. Before executing the placement, a visual stimulus had to be memorised and,
on indication, the placement movement was executed and the memorised stimuli had to be
recalled. Furthermore, Spiegel, Koester, Weigelt and Schack (2012) provided evidence that
such a grasping-WM interference cost (for re-planning) arises during movement planning,
not during the control phase, i.e., when executing the grasping movement.
Using a very similar design, it was further shown that also attention is affected by grasp
planning (Spiegel, Koester, & Schack, 2014). This study did not attempt to explain atten-
tion in itself; for more complete models of (visual) attention see, for example, Itti and Koch
(2001), Desimone and Duncan (1995), or Schneider (2013). Spiegel et al. (2014) were more
concerned with the specific processing during grasping and found that movement planning
influenced the allocation of attention. That is, when participants planned a leftward (or right-
ward) placement movement with their hand, more attentional resources were allocated to the
left visual field (right visual field, respectively) as stimuli within the according visual field
were better encoded and later recalled in contrast to the opposite visual field. This effect was
expected as it was already known that selecting a movement target position results in a spa-
tial attention shift towards the target position (e.g., Collins, Heed, & Ro¨der, 2010; Deubel,
Schneider, & Paprotta, 1998). Note, that such functional relations may differ for various
effectors. For example, in eye-tracking studies using also a dual-task paradigm (perceptual
judgements & motor planning) it was shown that saccades are necessarily preceded by at-
tention shifts to the target position whereas this is different for manual movements (reaching
Deubel, & Schneider, 2003). For immediate reaching, attention is shifted to the target posi-
tion but for delayed reaching this is not mandatory (Schneider, & Deubel, 2002, for review).
However, in Spiegel et al.’s (2014) study, there was no specific effect of the allocation
of attentional resources on the movement re-planning. Specifically, the cue for movement
execution was presented visually either in the left or in the right visual field but this position
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was irrelevant (as in a Simon task). Although such a stimulus should draw the attentional
focus towards the position of occurrence, the side of this visual cue did not interact with
the movement re-planning costs. That is, movement planning and spatial attention seem
not to influence one another in both directions. Clearly, the relationship between movement
planning and spatial attention is not trivial. Both processes may not share the same cognitive
resources because the influence should be bi-directional in such a case. Alternatively, one
may have to distinguish movement planning from changing a already specified plan (i.e., re-
planning; Quinn, & Sherwood, 1983). The latter possibility would be in accordance with the
results by Spiegel et al., (2013) where dual-task costs for additional grasp executions were
specific for visuo-spatial WM but re-planning costs were the same for verbal and visua-
spatial WM. For the present work, it is noted that also WM and (spatial) attention have been
shown to interact with the action domain in intricate and yet not fully understood ways.
Finally, there is some evidence available regarding the interaction of the language and
the action domain. Similarities between action sequences and sentence structures have been
proposed (Greenfield et al., 72; Olmstead, Viswanathan, Aicher, & Fowler, 2009; Pastra,
& Aloimonos, 2012) and functional interactions have been reported (e.g., Boulenger, Roy,
Paulignan, Deprez, Jeannerod, & Nazir, 2006; Boulenger, Silber, Roy, Paulignan, Jeannerod,
& Nazir, 2008; Fischer, & Zwaan, 2008; Rueschemeyer, Lindemann, van Elk, & Bekkering,
2009, for review). For example, Hickok (2012) applied recently the re-afference principle,
known from the domain of motor control (von Holst, & Mittelsta¨dt, 1950), to language
production, specifically to phonological encoding and articulation. For neurophysiological
aspects, it is noted that ERPs can are beneficial to such questions because many language
processes and also many movements critically depend on precise timing and are usually very
fast (cf: Essig et al., 2014). That is, ERPs can help to investigate the timing, duration and
succession of particular cognitive processes (Kutas, & Van Petten, 1994).
Specifically, Amsel and colleagues reported an ERP study in which they investigated the
processing of action-related (graspability) and conceptual information (semantics: living vs.
non-living) during word reading (Amsel, Urbach, & Kutas, 2013). For this study, Amsel et
al. (2013) used a go/no-go paradigm in order to evaluate when graspability and conceptual
information is processed. That is, whether these information are processed at the same time
or in which order these information become available. The results suggest that conceptual
information (available after 150–200ms) are processed well before graspability information
(available after 340ms). That is, it is estimated to take about 190ms more to access gras-
pability information than conceptual information in this reading task. Importantly, the task
may have emphasised the semantic evaluation, and the task did not require any complex
movement which was also noted by Amsel et al. (2013).
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Concerning this issue, we contribute some preliminary data on the functional interaction 
of conceptual/semantic noun information and (uni-manual) grasping behaviour (Koester, & 
Schack, in press). In a go/no-go paradigm (based on lexical decisions), participants 
executed either precision or power grips on objects of various sizes but with an equal weight 
and surface. Grasping was performed in response to nouns (go trials; pseudo words repre-
sented no-go trials) which referred to small (e.g., ”raisin”) or larger objects (e.g., ”apple”) 
in critical trials. Grip executions and word reading were fully crossed as factors so that grip 
execution (small vs. larger corresponding to precision and power grips) and conceptual noun 
information (small vs. large; implicit object size) could be congruent or incongruent. The 
important question was whether and, if so, when an interaction would occur. If conceptual 
information has priority over action-related information (graspability) as suggested by Am-
sel et al.’s (2013) results, an interaction should only occur after about 340 ms after word 
onset. However, if the behavioural task requirements do affect processing, action-related 
information may gain priority and an interaction could be expected as early as 150–200 ms 
given the availability of conceptual information according to Amsel et al. (2013).
The results show an early interaction of grip execution and conceptual noun informa-
tion between 100 and 200 ms after word onset. In addition, there was an N400 effect for 
conceptual noun information between 500 and 650 ms (Koester, & Schack, in press). The 
preliminary finding of this early interaction argues for a context- or task-dependent pro-
cessing configuration as also discussed as a possibility by Amsel et al. (2013). Notably, 
the word stimuli in our study were nouns, not verbs which means that they do not directly 
refer to actions as in the studies of Boulenger et al. (2006, 2008). Furthermore, the nouns 
were spatially less related to the action object than in other studies that suggest a semantic 
influence on kinematic features of grasping (Glover, Rosenbaum, Graham, & Dixon, 2004) 
where the words were printed on the objects that had to be grasped. At present, it can only 
be speculated whether action affordances are an inherent part of lexical representations (i.e., 
of nouns) in analogy to the suggestion that action affordances are an integral part of object 
representations (Tucker, & Ellis, 2001, 2004). After all, our finding (Koester, & Schack, in 
press) is in line with a functional interaction of the action and the language domain, at least 
for lexical representations.
In this chapter, I have discussed some recent (and selected) evidence that points towards
an interaction among cognitive domains. Yet, the results do not suggest that the whole cog-
nitive system is fully interactive. Even in this selected presentation, it was found that some
domains or functions may not influence each other, for example, the influence of spatial
attention on grasping re-planning appears to be small if there should be an influence at all
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(Spiegel et al., 2014). The reviewed work suggests that a task or the context impacts the
neurophysiological processing of language, presumably via prediction as a cognitive mech-
anism. The visual processing of event sequences seems to share some (neural) processing
resources (BA 44) with an often found language network. Also, uni manual grasping inter-
acts neurophysiologically very early with language processing and also with further domains
such as WM and attention. That is, the evidence from our described work points towards in-
teractive cognitive processes at least for visual (sequence) perception, language and action.
Overall, the present findings contrast with the strict idea of informational encapsulation
of perceptual-cognitive domains (e.g., Fodor, 1983; Sperber, 1994). A common structural
processing has been proposed, more specifically, for action and language (e.g., Pulvermu¨ller,
2005, 2014; Moro, 2014; Guerra-Filho, & Aloimonos, 2012) but such conceptions are still
being discussed (Fodor, 2000; Boeckx, & Fujita, 2014). At least, the evidence presented
here indicates some interactions among cognitive domains, that is, shared use of resources or
exchange of information. Together with the general, neuroanatomical distinction of sensory
and motor systems (incl. various modalities), the present evidence favours a weak modularity
that allows for various interactions among the (neuro)cognitive modules.
Summary & conclusions
The topic of the present work is the human neurocognitive system and my aim was to con-
tribute some evidence to further our understanding of it by testing for interactions or sharing
of resources among cognitive domains. To this end, several methods were employed and
various variables analysed. Following an action-centred and modular approach to the cogni-
tive system in accordance with the ideomotor framework (e.g., Prinz, 1987, 1997; Hommel
et al., 2001; Hoffmann, 1993; Schack, & Ritter, 2009), I pursued the hypotheses that there
are functional interactions among (some) cognitive domains and that hierarchical processing
might be characteristic of multiple (if not all) domains (Norman, 1980; Velichkovsky, 1993).
To test these hypotheses, various neurocognitive approaches were used. Event-related
potentials and fMRI were used to evaluate temporal and spatial aspects of neurocognitive
(brain) processes. Additionally, behavioural and cognitive measures were employed to assess
the structure of cognitive representations and behavioural relevance of the processes and
representations. The present work makes some contributions to action and language research
incl. a methodological advance, visual sequence processing and interactions among these
domains (or sharing of resources).
Regarding action research, an overview was provided with a classification of various 
forms of responses (or response systems) into overt and covert responses which may be 
brought about by specific or unspecific parts of the nervous system (cf. Fig. 2.1, p. 20). The 
benefits of neurocognitive methods for action research in general and movement sciences 
more specifically has been pointed out, for example, in recording peripheral or central mea-
sures of cognitive processing (Koester, & Schack, 2014; Essig et al., 2014). Consequently, 
one contribution of our work is the demonstration of reliable measurement of ERPs (and 
cognitive ERP components, i.e., N400 effects) during movement execution (speaking, trans-
lating, & grasping + reading; Koester, & Schiller, 2008; Christoffels et al., 2013; 
Koester & Schack, in press; cf. Ganushchak, Christoffels, & Schiller, 2011, for a 
language production review). Although, the EEG signal has sometimes been measured 
during move-
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ments, it should be stressed that now also ERPs which are smaller by a magnitude than the
EEG signal, can be used to investigate action control.
In the domain of language, six studies were reported within this project regarding lex-
ical processing, that is morphology, in the field of comprehension (auditory & visual) and
production (speaking). For production, the estimated time course of morphological process-
ing (Indefrey, & Levelt, 2004) was confirmed by ERP measurements (about 350ms after
picture onset for a mean response latency of about 650ms) but the according functional
neuroanatomical correlate could not be substantiated (Koester, & Schiller, 2008, 2011). In
fact, morphological processing seems to be associated with BA 47 rather than temporal ar-
eas. Some of these findings presumably have encouraged further investigations showing
that morphological priming is temporally robust and can work also across languages (e.g.,
Verdonschot, Middelburg, Lensink, & Schiller, 2012; Kaczer, Timmer, Bavassi, & Schiller,
2015).
For morphological processing (decomposition), prosody and orthotactic information (bi-
gram frequency) could be shown to be reliable and effective cues (Lemho¨fer et al., 2011;
Koester, 2014). These cues are proposed to facilitate the distinction of compound from
non-compound words and to detect the constituent boundaries for structured interpretation
according to the constituents’ roles. Given the evidence that compound words are decom-
posed, composition is required (i.e., semantic integration) to arrive at the whole compound’s
meaning. Accordingly, it has been shown that semantic composition proceeds incremen-
tally. This is the case for lexical-semantic access as well as for lexical-semantic constituent
integration (Koester et al., 2009; Holle et al., 2010). These studies support theories that
assume multiple routes of (lexical) processing and point towards flexible processing mecha-
nisms (e.g., Arcara, Marelli, Buodo, & Mondini, 2014; Hagoort, 2008). In contrast, they are
difficult to reconcile with a delayed access account (Isel et al., 2003).
Regarding perception, specifically visual processing of event sequences, we investigated
the processing of hierarchical sequences that consisted of novel visual stimuli that could not
be verbalised. Here, the neural processing was investigated by comparing two types of rules,
a hierarchically structured and a local (non-hierarchical) rule (Koester, & Prinz, 2007). The
ERPs point towards qualitatively distinct processing of local rule information and hierarchi-
cal rule knowledge. Interestingly, in a related fMRI study, BA 44 (part of Broca’s area) has
been implicated in processing hierarchical compared with non-hierarchical rules suggesting
some shared neural resource for non-linguistic sequence processing (in visual perception;
Bahlmann et al., 2009) because BA 44 has been associated with language processing (e.g.,
Miceli et al., 2002; Nishitani et al., 2004; Heim et al., 2009; Sahin et al., 2009).
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The present findings are generally in line with a hierarchical processing conception as has
been discussed previously for action control (motor system & long-term actions such as, for
example, obtaining a driving licence; cf: Heckhausen, 1991; Velichkovsky, 1993; Schack,
2010) and language. For example, climbing knowledge of athletes is cognitively represented
in a hierarchically structured manner, and their behavioural performance (priming effects)
support a cognitive organisation according to functional features which are superordinate to
(visual) surface features (Bla¨sing et al., 2014, cf. Pezzulo et al., 2010). Similarly, the hier-
archical structure of compound words—at least distinguishing head and modifier roles—is
generally accepted in linguistics and supported by the empirical data reported in Chapter 3.
Importantly, our translation work also supports a hierarchical architecture of the language
domain. Single word translation would be a prime candidate for serial (or associative) pro-
cessing because word forms from one language could be ”translated” by simple associative
links to word forms from the other language, that is, without involving any ”higher” level of
processing.2 In contrast, our findings indicate that even single word translation shows neuro-
physiological signs of semantic mediation, that is, implying meaning representations which
are superordinate to word form representations (Christoffels et al., 2013). Therefore, it is
argued that the above-mentioned findings are in line with hierarchically structured represen-
tations and processing at least in the investigated domains. Such a hierarchical architecture
within cognitive domains does not invalidate all serial processing mechanisms (e.g., S-R as-
sociations) but they may be more appropriate for an explanation of behaviour in relatively
simple situations (Velichkovsky, 1993).
Although there is good evidence for the assumption that the cognitive system is function-
ally subdivided, that is, it contains in parts cognitive modules, the present work also shows
that there are (some) interactions among (some) domains. In the present project, I have
presented neurophysiological evidence for an influence of one executive function, namely
prediction on the manner and intensity of language comprehension. If spoken language is
irrelevant for a person, there still seems to be semantic processing, presumably in the sense
of shallow processing (Craik, & Lockhart, 1972), and we reported an N400 effect for such
irrelevant semantic incongruencies between pictures and sentences (Schiller et al., 2009).
In contrast, if the spoken language is task-relevant, the N400 effect became larger, that is,
semantic processing is deeper, but there is also an additional, very early PMN effect that is
suggestive of predictive processes. Hence, language processing changed also qualitatively,
presumably by predicting upcoming words which is not a linguistic processes. Similarly,
language related neural resources (BA 44) have been found in the service of (hierarchical)
2Such associative links would very likely not work for sentences, but see Elman (1991) andWeckerly and Elman (1992).
48 SUMMARY & CONCLUSIONS
sequence processing (in addition to pre-SMA; Bahlmann et al., 2009; Koechlin, & Jubault, 
2006). This finding suggests that sequence processing and language share partially neural 
resources which is considered equivalent to a functional interaction between domains. At 
present, it is not clear yet whether or not this BA 44 activation could be related to predic-
tive processing (i.e., prediction of goals, Bubic et al., 2010; Schubotz, 2007, 2010). Finally, 
we reported also an early neurophysiological interaction between motor control (grasping) 
and language processing (single word reading; Koester, & Schack, in press). For re-cent 
investigations of common processing mechanisms in language production and action, see 
de Zubicaray, Hartsuiker, and Acheson (2014). The above-mentioned studies are taken to 
support the claim of functional interactions among (some) cognitive modules and, thus, 
underline the need to further investigate the integrated architecture of the human cognitive 
system.
In sum, the current work provides neurocognitive evidence, next to a methodological
contribution, for the domains of action control, language processing and (visual) sequence
perception. The results are consistent with the claim that within these domains cognitive
processes can be characterised by hierarchical structures. Furthermore, the results point
towards functional interactions among these cognitive domains. In this sense, the present
project contributes to a better understanding of the characteristic features of an architecture
of the cognitive system.
Not quite surprisingly, this project has also limitations. Certainly, one cannot generalise
the findings from the presently investigated domains to all other cognitive domains. That
is, more research should be devoted to testing other domains and potential relationships.
Also, the absence of an influence in a given study (e.g., no influence of spatial attention on
re-planning costs in grasping; Spiegel et al., 2014), may reflect the independence of given
domains or be due to a small effect size, that is, an effect might simply be undetected. More-
over, the direction of influence between domains may be uni- or bi-directional. Also, it would
be interesting to learn where domains do not interact, that is an informational boundary (rem-
iniscent of encapsulation). As said, if there are hierarchical principles of organisation in the
cognitive domains, it does not rule out other non-hierarchical processing as in associations.
Finally, I believe that it has to be accepted at present that we do not fully understand the
relations between neurophysiological responses and cognitive functions. Even some well-
research neurophysiological responses are not fully understood. For example, the N400 was
thought to uniformly reflect semantic processing effort (beginning with Kutas, & Hillyard,
1980; Kutas, & Federmeier, 2011). But, over the last 40 or so years, the N400 has been
found responsive to various cognitive processes. Currently, it is seriously discussed whether
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the N400 is actually fractionated into multiple sub functions (e.g., Lau, Phillips, & Poeppel,
2008; Pylkka¨nen, & Marantz, 2003).
Future research efforts in this field may benefit from the combined employment of new
experimental techniques and the use of (more) realistic settings. The suggestion of method
combination has the potential to contribute to answers to new research questions, rather
than investigating the same phenomenon from another perspective, that is, by using another
method. For example, using ERPs and fMRI to investigate morphological priming helped to
tie a specific processing time course to a particular neural substrate for testing a neurocog-
nitive model of language production. Ideally, the methods could be applied simultaneously
which becomes more and more feasible. Eye-tracking is also a very promising tool that can
be combined with the EEG/ERP methodology, not only for movement sciences, as pointed
out in Essig et al., (2014). Eye movements can also be recorded during movement execu-
tion in realistic settings (Foerster, Carbone, Koesling, & Schneider, 2011, 2012; Wascher,
Heppner, & Hoffmann, 2014, for ERP measurements in realistic action contexts) and can be
combined with many established experimental paradigms (e.g., the visual world paradigm;
Knoeferle, Habets, Crocker, & Mu¨nte, 2008; Tanenhaus, Spivey-Knowlton, Eberhard, &
Sedivy, 1995).
In line with the ideomotor perspective, the cognitive system is conceived of as organis-
ing behaviour (here, with a focus on voluntary actions), that is, generation of sequences of
motor actions or linguistic (communicative) utterances in an optimal or at least efficient way.
Distinguishable cognitive domains are acknowledged. That is, even some early scientific
localisations such as a cortical motor area by Fritsch and Hitzig, visual processing in the
occipital lobe (by Munk; Oeser, 2002; Shiraev, 2015), or Broca’s and Wernicke’s localisa-
tions of language functions are still valid.3 Although distinguishable domains are akin to the
concept of processing modules, some functional and neurophysiological interactions among
domains must be accepted. Here, the organisation of complex behaviour, that is, the func-
tion of the cognitive system, is suggested to follow hierarchical principles in representing
and processing information in the sense of generative (i.e., creative) operations (Boeckx, &
Fujita, 2014).
In closing, and keeping in mind the above-mentioned limitations, one may say that the
function of cognitive processes (which can be conceived of as computations; cf. Miller et
al., 1960; Bandura, 1965; Fodor, 1983; 2000) is to generate sequences (for acting, speaking,
or predicting upcoming events) by applying hierarchical rules. Such rules but not serial
associations mechanisms can explain long-distance dependencies (within action chains or
3The precise language functions of Broca’s and Wernicke’s areas are still debated but not their involvement in language
processing.
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sentences). Our current research findings do not contradict the hypothesis that hierarchical
representations and processing are a common principle of the human cognitive domains and
their neurophysiological underpinnings.
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was investigated. Experiment 1 evaluated the representation of climbing holds in the long-term mem-
ory of climbers and non-climbers with the help of a psychometric measurement method. Within a
hierarchical splitting procedure subjects had to decide about the similarity of required grasping pos-
tures. For the group of climbers, representation structures corresponded clearly to four grip types. In
the group of non-climbers, representation structures differed more strongly than in climbers and did
not clearly refer to grip types. To learn about categorical knowledge activation in Experiment 2, a
priming paradigm was applied. Images of hands in grasping postures were presented as targets and
images of congruent, neutral, or incongruent climbing holds were used as primes. Only in climbers,
reaction times were shorter and error rates were smaller for the congruent condition than for the incon-
gruent condition. The neutral condition resulted in intermediate performance. The findings suggest
that perception of climbing holds activates the commonly associated grasping postures in climbers
but not in non-climbers. The findings of this study give evidence that the categorization of visually
perceived objects is fundamentally influenced by the cognitive-motor potential for interaction, which
depends on the observers experience and expertise. Thus, motor expertise not only facilitates precise




3) Essig, K., Janelle, C., Borgo, F., & Koester, D. (2014). Attention and Neurocognition. In: A.
Papaioannou & D. Hackfort (Eds.), Routledge Companion to Sport and Exercise Psychology: Global
Perspectives and Fundamental Concepts, (pp. 253–271). London: Routledge.
Abstract
Attention plays a central role in action and movement control and refers to the processing of relevant
and suppression or irrelevant information. Following the theoretical background, we describe spatial
and temporal brain bases for attentional control. These provide the neural underpinnings for cognitive
aspects of attention such as ’what’ (object identity) and ’where’ (object location) information. The
next section describes different forms of attentional focus in the context of various sport situations that
are differently reliant on attentional width and direction for effective information processing. These
processes have been deeply investigated by eye-tracking methods, often emphasizing visual search.
Visual search strategies reflect the temporal focusing and extraction of context relevant information
depending on bottom-up and top-down processes. Visual search is often used within the expertise
approach. In this approach the gaze patterns of athletes of different skill levels are compared to rel-
ative non-experts to determine the cognitive processes underlying optimal and non-optimal (motor)
performances. The chapter concludes with aspects of distraction and other attentional problems.
DOI: 10.4324/9781315880198.ch17 (http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781315880198.ch17)
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4) Koester, D., & Schiller, N. O. (2008). Morphological Priming in Language Production: Electro-
physiological Evidence from Dutch. NeuroImage, 42, 1622–1630.
Abstract
The present study investigated morphological priming in Dutch and its time course in overt speech
production using a long-lag priming paradigm. Prime words were compounds that were morpho-
logically related to a picture name (e.g., the word jaszak, ’coat pocket’ was used for a picture of a
coat; Dutch: jas) or form-related monomorphemic words (e.g., jasmijn, ’jasmine’). The morphologi-
cally related compounds could be semantically transparent (e.g.; eksternest, ’magpie nest’) or opaque
(e.g. eksteroog, lit. ’magpie eye’, ’corn’, for a picture of a magpie, Dutch: ekster). Behavioral and
event-related potential (ERP) data were collected in two sessions. The production of morphologically
related and complex words facilitated subsequent picture naming and elicited a reduced N400 com-
pared with unrelated prime words. The effects did not differ for transparent and opaque relations.
Mere form overlap between a prime word and a target picture name did not affect picture naming.
These results extend previous findings from German to another language and demonstrate the feasi-
bility of measuring cognitive ERP components during overt speech. Furthermore, the results suggest
that morphological priming in language production cannot be reduced to semantic and phonological
processing. The time course of these priming effects as reflected in the ERP measure is in accordance
with a meta-analytic temporal estimate of morphological encoding in speaking [Indefrey, P., & Lev-
elt, W.J.M. (2004). The spatial and temporal signatures of word production components. Cognition,
92, 101–144.] suggesting that morphological relations are encoded at the word form level.
DOI: 10.1016/j.neuroimage.2008.06.043 (http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.neuroimage.2008.06.043)
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5) Koester, D., & Schiller, N. O. (2011). The functional neuroanatomy of morphology in language
production. NeuroImage, 55, 732–741.
Abstract
The present study investigated the neural correlates of morphological priming in overt Dutch lan-
guage production using a long-lag priming paradigm. Compound words were read out loud as primes
that were morphologically related to picture names (e.g., the word jaszak, ’coat pocket’ was used
for a picture of a coat; Dutch: jas), or primes were form-related, but not morphologically related
monomorphemic words (e.g., jasmijn, ’jasmine’). The morphologically related compounds could be
semantically transparent (e.g., eksternest, ’magpie nest’) or opaque (e.g., eksteroog, lit. ’magpie eye,’
’corn,’ for a picture of a magpie, Dutch: ekster). These four priming conditions were complemented
by two matched, unrelated conditions. The production of morphologically related, complex words but
not the production of form-related words facilitated subsequent picture naming. Also, morphologi-
cally related but not form-related words led to a neural priming effect in the left inferior frontal gyrus
(LIFG). The effects did not differ for transparent and opaque relations. The results point to a func-
tional role of LIFG in morphological information processing during language production contrary to
previous meta-analytic findings. Specifically, morphological priming effects in language production
seem to be independent from semantic overlap. However, further research should confirm the inde-
pendence of morphological and phonological factors. It is suggested that LIFG subserves word form
encoding in language production.
DOI: 10.1016/j.neuroimage.2010.11.044 (http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.neuroimage.2010.11.044)
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6) Koester, D., Holle, H., & Gunter, T. C. (2009). Electrophysiological evidence for incremental
lexical-semantic integration in auditory compound comprehension. Neuropsychologia, 47, 1854–
1864.
Abstract
The present study investigated the time-course of semantic integration in auditory compound word
processing. Compounding is a productive mechanism of word formation that is used frequently in
many languages. Specifically, we examined whether semantic integration is incremental or is delayed
until the head, the last constituent in German, is available. Stimuli were compounds consisting of
three nouns, and the semantic plausibility of the second and the third constituent was manipulated
independently (high vs. low). Participants’ task was to listen to the compounds and evaluate them
semantically. Event-related brain potentials in response to the head constituents showed an increased
N400 for less plausible head constituents, reflecting the lexical-semantic integration of all three com-
pound constituents. In response to the second (less plausible) constituents, an increased N400 with a
central-left scalp distribution was observed followed by a parietal positivity. The occurrence of this
N400 effect during the presentation of the second constituents suggests that the initial two non-head
constituents are immediately integrated. The subsequent positivity might be an instance of a P600
and is suggested to reflect the structural change of the initially constructed compound structure. The
results suggest that lexical-semantic integration of compound constituents is an incremental process





7) Holle, H., Gunter, T. C., & Koester, D. (2010). The time course of lexical access in morphologi-
cally complex words. NeuroReport, 21, 319–323.
Abstract
Compounding, the concatenation of words (e.g., ’dishwasher’), is an important mechanism across
many languages. This study investigated whether access of initial compound constituents occurs im-
mediately or, alternatively, whether it is delayed until the last constituent (i.e., the head). Electroen-
cephalogram was measured as participants listened to German two-constituent compounds. Both the
initial as well as the following head constituent could consist of either a word or a nonword, resulting
in four experimental conditions. Results showed a larger N400 for initial nonword constituents, sug-
gesting that lexical access was attempted before the head. Thus, this study provides direct evidence
that lexical access of transparent compound constituents in German occurs.
DOI: 10.1097/WNR.0b013e328335b3e0
(http://dx.doi.org/10.1097/WNR.0b013e328335b3e0)
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8) Koester, D. (2014). Prosody in parsing morphologically complex words: Neurophysiological evi-
dence. Cognitive Neuropsychology, 31, 147–163.
Abstract
Little is known about the neurophysiological correlates of lexical prosody in the comprehension
of compound words, i.e., morphologically complex words. Here, it is investigated whether lexical
prosody influences the decomposition of spoken compound words. In order to explore the neurophys-
iological correlates (event-related potentials, ERP) of a compound prosody, German native speakers
had to judge the number agreement between numerals and nouns which did or did not agree in 50% of
the cases. Importantly, the nouns carried either a compound or non-compound (single noun) prosody.
The compound prosody led to increased reaction times (RTs) and reduced judgement accuracy. Crit-
ically, number violations for words with a compound prosody elicited an increased ERP negativity
that was delayed by about 600ms relative to a left-anterior negativity elicited by number violations
for a single noun prosody. The ERP effect for the compound prosody preceded the according be-
havioural response by about 200ms, and the ERP peak latency effect correlated with the RT effect.
These findings suggest that the ERP effect for the compound prosody could be functionally related to
the accurate judgement performance for the compound prosody. The results suggest, more generally,
that prosody plays a critical role in auditory compound comprehension and morphological processing.
DOI: 10.1080/02643294.2013.857649 (http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02643294.2013.857649)
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9) Lemho¨fer, K., Koester, D., & Schreuder, R. (2011). When bicycle pump is harder to read than
bicycle bell: Effects of parsing cues in first and second language compound reading. Psychonomic
Bulletin & Review, 18, 364–370.
Abstract
Reading and understanding morphologically complex words can sometimes be a particular challenge
to non native speakers. For example, compound words consist of multiple free morphemes, often-
times without explicit marking of the morpheme boundaries. In a lexical decision task, we investi-
gated compound reading in native and non native speakers of Dutch. The compounds differed in that
the letter bigram that formed the morpheme boundary could or could not occur within a Dutch mor-
pheme, thus providing an orthotactic cue as to the position of the morpheme boundary. Native and
non native speakers responded faster to compounds that contained such an orthotactic cue. Additional
analyses showed that although native speakers used this cue for long, but not for short compounds,
no such word length modulation was observed for non native speakers. It is suggested that orthotactic
parsing cues are used during compound reading and possibly even more so in non native speakers.
DOI: 10.3758/s13423-010-0044-y (http://dx.doi.org/10.3758/s13423-010-0044-y)
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10) Christoffels, I. K., Ganushchak, L., & Koester, D. (2013). Language conflict in translation: An
ERP study of translation production. Journal of Cognitive Psychology, 25, 646–664.
Abstract
Although most bilinguals can translate with relative ease, the underlying neuro-cognitive processes
are poorly understood. Using event-related brain potentials (ERPs) we investigated the temporal
course of word translation. Participants translated words from and to their first (L1, Dutch) and sec-
ond (L2, English) language while ERPs were recorded. Interlingual homographs (IHs) were included
to introduce language conflict. IHs share orthographic form but have different meanings in L1 and L2
(e.g., ”room” in Dutch refers to CREAM). Results showed that the brain distinguished between trans-
lation directions as early as 200 ms after word presentation: the P2 amplitudes were more positive in
the L1!L2 translation direction. The N400 was also modulated by translation direction, with more
negative amplitudes in the L2!L1 translation direction. Furthermore, the IHs were translated more
slowly, induced more errors, and elicited more negative N400 amplitudes than control words. In a
naming experiment, participants read aloud the same words in L1 or L2 while ERPs were recorded.
Results showed no effect of either IHs or language, suggesting that task schemas may be crucially
related to language control in translation. Furthermore, translation appears to involve conceptual pro-
cessing in both translation directions, and the task goal appears to influence how words are processed.
DOI: 10.1080/20445911.2013.821127 (http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/20445911.2013.821127)
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11) Schiller, N. O., Horemans, I., Ganushchak, L., & Koester, D. (2009). Event-related brain poten-
tials during the monitoring of speech errors. NeuroImage, 44, 520–530.
Abstract
When we perceive speech, our goal is to extract the meaning of the verbal message which includes
semantic processing. However, how deeply do we process speech in different situations? In two
experiments, native Dutch participants heard spoken sentences describing simultaneously presented
pictures. Sentences either correctly described the pictures or contained an anomalous final word
(i.e., a semantically or phonologically incongruent word). In the first experiment, spoken sentences
were task-irrelevant and both anomalous conditions elicited similar centro-parietal N400s that were
larger in amplitude than the N400 for the correct condition. In the second experiment, we ensured
that participants processed the same stimuli semantically. In an early time window, we found similar
phonological mismatch negativities for both anomalous conditions compared to the correct condition.
These negativities were followed by an N400 that was larger for semantic than phonological errors.
Together, these data suggest that we process speech semantically, even if the speech is task-irrelevant.
Once listeners allocate more cognitive resources to the processing of speech, we suggest that they
make predictions for upcoming words, presumably by means of the production system and an inter-
nal monitoring loop, to facilitate lexical processing of the perceived speech.
DOI: 10.1016/j.neuroimage.2008.09.019 (http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.neuroimage.2008.09.019)
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12) Koester, D., & Prinz, W. (2007). Capturing regularities in event sequences: Evidence for two
mechanisms. Brain Research, 1180, 59–77.
Abstract
The processing of regular event sequences was investigated by presenting categorical visual events
in sequences that followed a rule system and a category restriction. Participants’ task was to detect
deviations of the rule or category restriction (single deviants) or both (double deviants). In Experi-
ment 1, participants detected double deviants faster and more accurately than single deviants. This
result is compatible with statistical facilitation, i.e., with distinct information processing in two chan-
nels. Experiment 2 used the same paradigm but did not require an immediate behavioural response
to deviants. Here, event-related brain potentials revealed a redundant deviance effect in the P3 com-
ponent (i.e., shorter latency and larger amplitude for double deviants compared with either single
deviant). Category restriction deviants additionally led to an increased P2 amplitude. It is suggested
that rule and category restriction information is processed separately at central levels, and that two
central stages can be distinguished in the processing of categorical visual sequence events that make
different use of short-term and long-term memory resources.
DOI: 10.1016/j.brainres.2007.08.056 (http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.brainres.2007.08.056)
87
13) Bahlmann, J., Schubotz, R. I., Mueller, J. L., Koester, D., & Friederici, A. D. (2009). Neural
circuits of hierarchical visuo-spatial sequence processing. Brain Research, 1298, 161–170.
Abstract
Sequence processing has been investigated in a number of studies using serial reaction time tasks or
simple artificial grammar tasks. Little, however, is known about higher-order sequence processing
entailing the hierarchical organization of events. Here, we manipulated the regularities within se-
quentially occurring, non-linguistic visual symbols by applying two types of prediction rules. In one
rule (the adjacent dependency rule), the sequences consisted of alternating items from two different
categories. In the second rule (the hierarchical dependency rule), a hierarchical structure was gener-
ated using the same set of item types. Thus, predictions about non-adjacent elements were required
for the latter rule. Functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) was used to investigate the neural
correlates of the application of the two prediction rules. We found that the hierarchical dependency
rule correlated with activity in the pre-supplementary motor area and the head of the caudate nucleus.
In addition, in a hypothesis-driven ROI analysis in Broca’s area (BA 44), we found a significantly
higher hemodynamic response to the hierarchical dependency rule than to the adjacent dependency
rule. These results suggest that this neural network supports hierarchical sequencing, possibly con-
tributing to the integration of sequential elements into higher-order structural events. Importantly, the
findings suggest that Broca’s area is also engaged in hierarchical sequencing in domains other than
language.
DOI: 10.1016/j.brainres.2009.08.017 (http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.brainres.2009.08.017)
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14) Koester, D., & Schack, T. (in press). Action priority: Early neurophysiological interaction of
conceptual and motor representations. PLOS ONE.
Abstract
Handling our everyday life, we often react manually to verbal requests or instruction, but the func-
tional interrelations of motor control and language are not fully understood yet, especially their neu-
rophysiological basis. Here, we investigated whether specific motor representations for grip types
interact neurophysiologically with conceptual information, that is, when reading nouns. Participants
performed lexical decisions and, for words, executed a grasp-and-lift task on objects of different sizes
involving precision or power grips while the electroencephalogram was recorded. Nouns could de-
note objects that require either a precision or a power grip and could, thus, be (in)congruent with the
performed grasp. In a control block, participants pointed at the objects instead of grasping them. The
main result revealed an event-related potential (ERP) interaction of grip type and conceptual infor-
mation which was not present for pointing. Incongruent compared to congruent conditions elicited
an increased positivity (100 – 200ms after noun onset). Grip type effects were obtained in response-
locked analyses of the grasping ERPs (100 – 300ms at left anterior electrodes). These findings attest
that grip type and conceptual information are functionally related when planning a grasping action
but such an interaction could not be detected for pointing. Generally, the results suggest that control
of behaviour can be modulated by task demands; conceptual noun information (i.e., associated action
knowledge) may gain processing priority if the task requires a complex motor response.
DOI: not available yet
Koester, D., & Schack, T. (2016). Data from: Action priority: Early neurophysiological interaction
of conceptual and motor representations. Bielefeld University.
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